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ARTICLES
CIRCUIT PERSONALITIES
Allison Orr Larsen* & Neal Devins**
The U.S. Courts of Appeals do not behave as one; they have developed
circuit-specific practices that are passed down from one generation of
judges to the next. These different norms and traditions (some written
down, others not) exist on a variety of levels: rules governing oral
argument and the publishing of opinions, en banc practices, social
customs, case discussion norms, law clerk dynamics, and even selfimposed circuit nicknames. In this Article, we describe these varying
“circuit personalities” and then argue that they are necessary to the
very survival of the federal courts of appeals. Circuit-specific norms
and traditions foster collegiality and other rule-of-law values and, in
so doing, serve as a critical counterweight to the pernicious
nationalization and partisan politics of federal judicial appointments.
Making use of both empirical measures and interviews conducted with
eighteen U.S. Court of Appeals judges, this Article shows how samecircuit appeals judges forge a unique and consequential bond with each
other. This is true of Democrat and Republican appointees; it is true of
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a just-appointed judge or a senior-status judge. By mitigating national
partisan forces, “circuit personalities” facilitate the very model of
judging employed by the U.S. Courts of Appeals—one that assumes any
random panel of three can deliberate and deliver a correct result for
the court as a whole. This model of judging simply does not work if the
judges fall prey to “my team / your team” impulses—forces which are
growing steadily as a byproduct of the new nationalization of judicial
appointments. To be sure, judges are ideologically divided, and
partisan divisions among them are sometimes inevitable. But the best
way to prevent those divisions from overtaking appellate courts
altogether is for judges to invest in the ties that bind them—to celebrate
the local and resist growing calls that they become “partisan warriors”
in a national war.
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INTRODUCTION
The arena for judicial appointment battles today is national: the
nominees are largely picked from lists created by national organizations,
the tradition of deferring to home-state senators is vanishing, and the
people selected as federal judges are increasingly those with national
connections not regional ones.1 Ironically, though, the judges who go on
to the U.S. Courts of Appeals inherit surprisingly local jobs. Although
typically lumped together, the thirteen federal appellate courts do not
behave as one; they have developed distinct local rules and customs that
tend to endure over time.
These circuit-specific practices (some written down, others not) exist
on multiple dimensions. Some relate to managing the docket: the
frequency of oral argument, the rate of published opinions, and the
regularity of en banc sittings.2 Other unique customs are not formalized.
Judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, for example,
descend from the bench after every argument and shake the hands of the
lawyers. Ninth Circuit judges and Fifth Circuit judges share bench memos
written by pools of law clerks. The Seventh Circuit circulates some panel
1

For observations along these lines, see Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Federalist Court,
Slate (Jan. 31, 2017, 10:12 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/01/how-the-federa
list-society-became-the-de-facto-selector-of-republican-supreme-court-justices.html [https://
perma.cc/JH3R-4UD3]; Carl Hulse, After Success in Seating Federal Judges, Biden Hits
Resistance, N.Y. Times (Dec. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/05/us/politi
cs/biden-judges-senate-confirmation.html [https://perma.cc/2JAW-VLRD] (noting the role of
“liberal interest groups” in influencing Biden’s judicial picks and demise of the blue slip
custom of deferring to home-state senators when confirming federal appellate judges); Adam
Liptak, White House Announces Slate of 11 Judicial Nominees, N.Y. Times (June 7, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/us/politics/trump-judicial-nominations.html [https://pe
rma.cc/3M5R-HATV] (“Many of the nominees are well known in the conservative legal
movement.”); see also infra Part III (delineating the rise of centralized national policies in the
appointment of judges).
2
Other scholars—most notably Marin Levy and Stephanie Lindquist—have done a lot of
valuable work describing some of these differences in case management. See, e.g., Marin K.
Levy & Jon O. Newman, The Office of Chief Circuit Judge, 169 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2425, 2441–
44 (2021); Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case
Management in the Circuit Courts, 61 Duke L.J. 315, 325 (2011); Stefanie A. Lindquist,
Bureaucratization and Balkanization: The Origins and Effects of Decision-making Norms in
the Federal Appellate Courts, 41 U. Rich. L. Rev. 659, 662–63 (2007); see also Virginia A.
Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist & Wendy L. Martinek, Judging on a Collegial Court 39–41
(2006) (describing institutional influences on rates of dissent among appellate judges,
including informal norms and overall workload). We build on their efforts by updating and
adding detail to the variation and then making a new argument for the increased importance
of these local practices today.
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opinions among all members of their court before publication in a “paper
en banc” and accommodates suggestions from judges who are not on the
panel. The Sixth Circuit has a “joviality committee” responsible for,
among other things, arranging river boat cruises. And the Third Circuit
even bears a self-imposed nickname—“the Mighty Third”—which one
can imagine is stitched on the back of their judicial softball jerseys.3
These local norms and traditions are sticky over time and form what
we refer to here as “circuit personalities”—customs and rules that are not
uniform nationally but loom large in framing the identity and daily life of
a federal appellate judge. Our goal in this Article is to describe these
unique circuit personality traits and then to argue that they are critically
important to buttressing collegiality and rule-of-law norms in this
political moment of historic partisan polarization.
We conducted interviews with eighteen federal appellate judges—at
least one sitting on each circuit and at least one appointed by every
President from Joe Biden to Gerald Ford. Those interviews taught us that
the circuits operate very differently from one another, and that these
organically grown rules and traditions are highly valued by judges, even
judges that come from widely different backgrounds and with diverging
ideologies.
To understand the significance of circuit personalities, it is important
to remember that a federal appeals judge is unique in our judicial system.4
Unlike district court judges or Supreme Court Justices (the latter of whom
have a growing habit of separate writings and reaching almost celebrity
status for their individual views),5 federal appellate judges are never lone
actors and rarely speak only for themselves. As Judge Wood of the
Seventh Circuit puts it, unlike the district court judge, who is “solo in the
3
All of these observations come from our interviews, the notes of which have been inspected
by the journal editors. As in other qualitative studies of judicial behavior, we assured each
judge we interviewed that we would not quote them by name without explicit permission, and
that is why our interviews are described anonymously. See Levy, supra note 2, at 326–27
(describing the same practice for her study).
4
Harry T. Edwards, Collegial Decision-Making in the US Courts of Appeals, in Collective
Judging in Comparative Perspective 57, 61 (Birke Häcker & Wolfgang Ernst eds., 2020) (“The
collegial operations and internal decision-making processes of the Supreme Court and the
Courts of Appeals are strikingly different.”).
5
Richard L. Hasen, Celebrity Justice: Supreme Court Edition, 19 Green Bag 2d 157, 158
(2016); Suzanna Sherry, Our Kardashian Court (and How to Fix It), 106 Iowa L. Rev. 181,
182 (2020) (“Television appearances, books, movies, stump speeches, and separate opinions
aimed at the Justices’ polarized fan bases have created cults of personality around individual
Justices.”).
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courtroom, mistress of all she surveys,” a court of appeals judge “cannot
hope to get anything done without persuading at least one fellow judge to
agree with her.”6
Indeed, the design structure of the federal courts of appeals requires
decisions in randomly assigned panels of three, and this means appellate
judges are supposed to be faceless and anonymous.7 For this system to
work, the judges need to buy into a particular model of judging: that any
panel of three can deliver a legitimate decision for the circuit as a whole.
Correspondingly, en banc reconsiderations are disfavored.8 The emphasis
is on the court and not the individual, and collegiality among the decision
makers is prized.9
Circuit personalities are integral to this model of judicial behavior.
Much like entrenched family traditions and social gatherings can help
bond a bickering family, so too do local norms and rules link circuit
judges and help them work together. Of course, the relevant rules and
traditions can change over time—and we identify instances where
specific circuits affirmatively sought to change their personality traits to
improve their decision making. Important to our argument, however, is
the fact that (like family traditions) the rules and norms come from within
the circuit and not from a national centralized source. In fact, the very
process of choosing circuit rules and traditions brings appeals judges
together in ways that reinforce their bonds to each other and to the court
itself. Likewise, the power of circuit judges to embrace new norms and
6

Diane P. Wood, When to Hold, When to Fold, and When to Reshuffle: The Art of
Decisionmaking on a Multi-Member Court, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 1445, 1446 (2012).
7
This design of three-judge-panel decision making on the Courts of Appeals is set forth in
28 U.S.C. § 46(b), (c). By statute, cases are decided on appeal by panels of three judges, unless
a majority of the judges in regular active service vote to hear the case all together or “en banc.”
Id. § 46(c). It is typically understood that judges are randomly assigned to panels; however,
this is not strictly required by the statute and recent studies have questioned whether panels
are truly randomly assigned in every circuit. See Adam S. Chilton & Marin K. Levy,
Challenging the Randomness of Panel Assignment in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 101
Cornell L. Rev. 1, 3–4, 9 (2015) (finding evidence of non-randomness in panel selection).
8
Neal Devins & Allison Orr Larsen, Weaponizing En Banc, 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1373, 1376
(2021).
9
As Judge Harris of the Fourth Circuit explains (in an article celebrating Judge Edwards of
the D.C. Circuit), “Getting it right, it turns out, is not only about the work ethic and the analytic
rigor. For Judge Edwards, it also is about the engagement with his colleagues, a collective
process in which judges reason their way together to the right answer.” Pamela Harris, A
Model of Collegiality: Judge Harry T. Edwards, 105 Judicature 76, 77–78 (2021),
https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/a-model-of-collegiality-judge-harry-t-edwards [https://per
ma.cc/WEV7-EHD4].
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traditions in order to facilitate orderly, collegial decision making makes
clear that circuit personalities can simultaneously advance rule-of-law
values and mitigate partisan fighting.
Part of our normative claim is thus quite intuitive: human contact and
communal traditions are critical ingredients in healthy collective judicial
decision making. Decisions are more efficiently handed down, consensus
is more likely, and fractured discord is prevented when the judges feel a
connection to one another.10 More than that, the desire to be liked and
respected by your colleagues is a basic psychological motivation.11
Indeed, life under the recent pandemic has truly brought this reality home.
Several of the judges we spoke to noted that without the regular face time
and social gatherings with their colleagues (cancelled due to COVID)
they have noticed less consensus on cases and sharper tones in dissents.12
The present moment, therefore, affords a unique opportunity to identify
and revalue traditions that were suspended during the pandemic.
Our claim goes beyond improving the daily lives of federal judges,
however. Because federal appellate judges are increasingly identified
with national groups as opposed to state actors, and since judicial
selectors increasingly prioritize demonstrated allegiance to national
movements with ideological ties, we are facing something new and
worrisome: a model of judicial decision making that falls prey to the “my
team / your team” partisan impulses that plague the entire country.13

10
We take these values as a given for healthy judicial decision making. It is of course
possible to believe good judging rejects consensus-building and embraces sharp
disagreements. Those readers should still find our descriptive findings of interest—even if
they are not persuaded by the rest of our argument.
11
See Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences 25 (2006).
12
See Interview with 4th Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview
with 11th Cir. Judge (Apr. 1, 2021) (notes on file with editors); see also Frank Green, Judges
and Observers of Powerful Court of Appeals Express Concern on Partisanship, Rich. TimesDispatch (Sept. 3, 2021), https://richmond.com/news/state-and-regional/judges-and-obser
vers-of-powerful-federal-appeals-court-express-concern-on-partisanship/article_9981c9ed-c
39c-5f46-8df1-4246cf4ad790.html [https://perma.cc/4G6B-RRWV] (noting the sharp tone
between Judge Wynn and Judge Wilkinson on dissents from denial in the Fourth Circuit).
There of course could be other factors aggravating this discord besides a lack of personal
contact, but the increased isolation certainly does not help foster collegiality.
13
See supra note 1; see also John M. Burman, Should Federal Judges Belong to or Openly
Support Organizations that Promote a Particular Ideology?, 13 Wyo. L. Rev. 189, 195 (2013)
(“One issue that has arisen is that with increasing frequency, judges are selected or not
selected, at least in part, because they belong to or openly support certain groups—groups that
openly profess adherence to certain ideological goals—and continue to belong to or openly
support those groups after assuming the bench. . . . Whatever the merits of either society, the
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Given this new reality, local circuit personalities are more important now
than ever before because they push back on troubling signs of partisanship
in judicial behavior.
And the warning signs of judicial partisanship are growing. The New
York Times reported in 2020 that judges appointed by President Trump
were less likely to concur with their Democratic-appointed counterparts
than were other Republican-appointed judges.14 Zalman Rothschild
documented a partisan correlation in recent judicial decisions on Free
Exercise challenges during COVID.15 And our own study about en banc
decision making in the Courts of Appeals indicates a post-2018 spike in
partisan behavior in en banc decisions—a spike that bucks a sixty-year
trend in the opposite direction.16
No doubt, federal appeals judges have ideological commitments and
partisan divisions are thus sometimes inevitable. We do not argue that
circuit personalities are a panacea to cure all divisions on the bench; that
train has left the station. Our target, instead, is the integrity of the decision
making by federal courts of appeals. Federal appeals judges should try to
preserve the consensus-driven decision-making model that is the hallmark
of their courts. Correspondingly, they should try to steer clear of
gratuitous separate opinions, partisan en banc review, and other attentionseeking behavior.17 Partisan divisions may be inevitable, but they need
not become the norm.

mere fact that a federal judge belongs to or openly supports one society or the other is
tantamount to wearing a banner that says ‘conservative’ or ‘liberal.’” ).
14
Rebecca R. Ruiz, Robert Gebeloff, Steve Eder & Ben Protess, A Conservative Agenda
Unleashed on the Federal Courts, N.Y. Times (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nyti
mes.com/2020/03/14/us/trump-appeals-court-judges.html [https://perma.cc/CB4M-CDF5].
15
Zalman Rothschild, Free Exercise Partisanship, 107 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 12) (“In the last five years, judicial partisanship in free exercise cases has
crescendoed. And when the pandemic struck, resulting in widespread lockdowns of religious
houses of worship, the unprecedented number of constitutional free exercise cases brought in
such a condensed span of time forced that partisanship into sharp relief.”).
16
Devins & Larsen, supra note 8, at 1380. For additional discussion of our en banc study,
see Adam Liptak, On Federal Appeals Courts, a Spike in Partisanship, N.Y. Times (Feb. 22,
2021), https://nytimes.com/2021/02/22/us/politics/courts-partisanship.html [https://perma.cc
/FQ6R-P744]. For a discussion of how Trump appointees to the Ninth Circuit are increasingly
dissenting from denials of petitions for en banc rehearings, see Andrew Wallender & Madison
Alder, Ninth Circuit Conservatives Use Muscle to Signal Supreme Court, Bloomberg L.: US
L. Week (Dec. 8, 2021, 4:45 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/ninthcircuit-conservatives-use-muscle-to-signal-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/48YS-EL4V].
17
By prioritizing that which is politically salient, moreover, appeals judges effectively limit
the right to appeal. En banc and separate opinions are time-consuming to write, and,

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1322

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:1315

The best way forward, we argue, is for federal appeals judges to double
down on the local ties that bind. By investing in circuit personalities (what
unites them), these judges avoid collateral costs that come with acting as
“partisan warriors” on a national stage.18 As we describe below, with
partisan fighting comes more dissents, less consensus, more screened-out
cases, less deliberation, more divisive headlines, and less anonymous
collective reasoning. The stakes, therefore, are enormously high: at risk
is the very model of appellate decision making we know.
In this Article, we will both highlight the pervasiveness of
nationalization and explain why it is that membership in a collegial circuit
mitigates the partisan pressure felt by federal judges in today’s polarized
environment. Local norms and traditions inculcate a loyalty to a smaller
group—separate from a national allegiance felt by the judges to, for
example, the Federalist Society or the American Constitution Society.
These unique traditions foster bipartisan relationships and a joint
commitment to the rule of law. Circuit personalities, in other words, are
an important counterweight to growing partisanship and nationalization.
This makes circuit personalities critically important to study and
imperative to secure.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes what we learned
from our judicial interviews and other research about the unique rules and
customs that vary from circuit to circuit. Mapping out these circuit
personalities is useful to both scholars of judicial decision making and
members of the judiciary themselves—many of whom, we learned, know
little about, and are curious to learn how, their sister circuits operate. Part
II explains why these differences are uniquely important to the job of a
federal appellate judge. Part III explains the centralizing partisan forces
that are threatening the more localized model of federal appellate judging.
This Article then concludes by explaining why circuit personalities are
important mitigating forces against growing national partisanship and
identifying some traits that are particularly desirable.

consequently, attention-seeking appeals judges will have less time to hear argument and write
precedential published opinions.
18
We borrow this phrase from Judge Wilkinson on the Fourth Circuit in connection with a
warning. See In re Trump, 958 F.3d 274, 292 (4th Cir. 2020) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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I. MAPPING OUT THE DIFFERENT CIRCUIT PERSONALITIES
The judges we interviewed were diverse in every way—age, gender,
race, politics, personal and professional backgrounds, years on the bench,
you name it. Notwithstanding all their differences, a consistent thread in
the interviews we conducted is the acknowledgment that the thirteen
circuits of the U.S. Courts of Appeals operate quite differently from one
another.19 Indeed, these differences are sometimes opaque not just to
outsiders but to insiders as well.20 Several of the judges we interviewed
joked that there is no user’s manual to appellate judging and that the only
way to really learn the ropes is through trial and error after one is sworn
in and on the job.
Some of these varying practices are enshrined in internal operating
procedures that exist for each circuit, but many other important rules and
traditions are only passed down orally from judge to judge. We examine
both sorts of practices here in an attempt to map out circuit personality
traits. We first discuss differences in case management—rules that are
simply required to run the business of courts. We then turn to the other
sort of variance that is harder to pin down—circuit-specific practices and
traditions related to the interpersonal dynamics of appellate judging.
Finally, we explore interesting episodes of personality changes, in which
a circuit identified a problem and changed its rules or practices to address
it.
A. Differences in Case Management
Although the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure govern all U.S.
Courts of Appeals, the Rules leave room for variation in how the various
dockets are managed. Or, in the words of the Federal Judicial Center (the
entity charged with improving judicial administration in all of the federal
courts), a “variety of practices and procedures . . . can comfortably coexist under the umbrella of the Federal Rules.”21 Varying practices in case

19
Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Stratification and the Reputations of the United States
Courts of Appeals, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1331, 1352 (2005) (“Over time, circuits appear to
implicitly develop cultures that manifest themselves in various ways.”).
20
For similar observations, see Levy, supra note 2, at 318 (“Even within the judiciary, a
void in knowledge exists. Judges themselves acknowledge that they are unacquainted with the
case-management practices of courts outside their own.”).
21
Judith A. McKenna, Laura L. Hooper & Mary Clark, Fed. Jud. Ctr., Case Management
Procedures in the Federal Courts of Appeals, at ix (2000).
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management
include
those
that
govern
oral
published/unpublished opinions, and going en banc.22

argument,

1. Oral Argument
A very obvious and well-documented difference among the circuits lies
in the frequency of oral argument. All of the circuits adopt a “one judge
rule”—any one judge can demand oral argument in any case.23 But the
circuits vary tremendously in the rate they grant argument and also in the
process through which they make that decision.
Marin Levy and Stefanie Lindquist have each documented the rates of
oral argument using data from the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts.24
According to Lindquist’s 2007 research, the First, Seventh, Second, and
D.C. Circuits are the courts that hear the most oral argument (based off of
percentage of all appeals terminated on the merits).25 Indeed the Second
Circuit rather famously grants argument in almost every case—even pro
se appeals—except for immigration cases, which have had their own nonargument calendar since shortly after 9/11.26 And the Seventh Circuit,
“with very minor exceptions,” grants arguments in every case that has a
lawyer on both sides.27 In terms of personality traits, that would make the
Second, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits “oral argument-heavy joint[s].”28

22
Some of this variation, of course, is just a reflection of the different conditions under
which the circuits operate—such as differences in the number of judges or the size of the
docket. Those conditions perhaps explain the origin of some of the rules and traditions we
describe below.
23
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) (oral argument is allowed unless a panel of three judges
unanimously decides it “unnecessary”). The circuits have all adopted a “one judge veto” rule
to implement this. See, e.g., 4th Cir. Internal Operating Proc. 34.2; 11th Cir. R. 34-3(b)(3).
24
Levy, supra note 2, at 319; Lindquist, supra note 2, at 664; see also Marin K. Levy & Jon
O. Newman, The Internal Operations and Practice of the Federal Courts of Appeals
(manuscript at 1–2, 11) (draft on file with author) (considering updated oral argument
statistics).
25
Lindquist, supra note 2, at 671.
26
Levy, supra note 2, at 336–37; see also Oral Argument, U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the 2d
Cir., https://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/clerk/case_filing/appealing_a_case/agency_case/oral_arg
ument.html [https://perma.cc/9DBG-MXDB] (last visited Jan. 3, 2022) (detailing the
immigration cases which are assigned to the non-argument calendar). For a fascinating look
at the collateral effects of a separate immigration calendar in the Second Circuit, see Bert I.
Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1123 (2011).
27
Diane P. Wood, Tribute, Missing Judge Tinder, 49 Ind. L. Rev. 903, 903 (2016).
28
Kent Streseman, Federal Court Practitioner Guides on Oral Argument, App. Advoc. Blog
(Sept. 4, 2019), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/appellate_advocacy/2019/09/federalcourt-practitioner-guides-on-oral-argument.html [https://perma.cc/BX89-ANCG].
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The other end of the spectrum—light on oral argument—finds the
Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits.29 Levy’s recent research—based on
2020 data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts—found that
the Fourth Circuit held the fewest arguments (only eight percent),
followed by the Eleventh and the Third Circuits (both at eleven percent).30
We took our own look at the data over recent five-year increments and
observed that this specific feature of circuit personalities (heavy/light on
oral argument) seems both quite varied and also very sticky, meaning the
practices persist over time.31 Consistent with both Lindquist and Levy, we
found that the D.C., Seventh, and Second Circuits heard the most oral
arguments, and the Eleventh, Third, and Fourth Circuits heard the least.

Oral Argument Rates by Circuit
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Not only does the bottom-line rate of oral argument differ from circuit
to circuit, but the screening process itself varies significantly. No circuit
grants oral argument in every case. All thirteen have some sort of process
in place to decide which cases go to argument and which do not. But the
exact point of entry for the staff attorney’s office and their specific
charges vary quite a bit from circuit to circuit: some circuits have decided
29

Lindquist, supra note 2, at 671; Levy & Newman, supra note 24, at 1–2 tbl.1.
See Levy & Newman, supra note 24, at 2.
31
To determine oral argument rates, we extracted data for 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020 from
Federal Court Cases: FJC Integrated Database (IDB) 1970 to Present, Fed. Jud. Ctr.,
https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb [https://perma.cc/FCW9-X327] (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
We identified cases with and without oral argument using the DISP field.
30
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“screening is a key way to save judicial time and is an appropriate task
for trained staff,” while others think the decision needs to rest squarely
with an Article III judge.32
In the Third and Tenth Circuits, for example, the judges largely
perform the screening function themselves. A case in the Third Circuit
gets screened for jurisdictional defects by a staff attorney, but the actual
decision to grant oral argument is made by the judges after full briefing is
complete.33 Similarly, when a case comes in the door at the Tenth Circuit,
it goes to a single judge first, and that judge is the one that separates (1)
easy cases that can be decided quickly (colloquially called “screeners”),
(2) cases that should go to the staff attorney’s office because they have a
big factual record, and (3) cases that should be argued.34 The judges on
the Tenth Circuit are asked to do this screening job first as a sort of
“triage”—it is considered their most urgent task.35
In other circuits—like the Fourth,36 the First, and the Fifth—the first
stop for a case that comes in the door is the staff attorney’s office.37 In
those circuits the decision on whether to grant oral argument is ultimately
made by judges, but only after the decision is primed with a memo from
the staff attorney’s office and a short opinion written by staff attorneys
for the judges to approve.38
Indeed, sometimes the staff attorney’s office runs quite a sophisticated
shop; it not only screens cases but also assigns weight to reflect the
32

Levy, supra note 2, at 339; see also 3d Cir. Internal Operating Procs. 2.1 (“The panel
determines whether there will be oral argument and the amount of time allocated. There is oral
argument if it is requested by at least one judge. Each judge communicates his or her views to
the other panel members.”).
33
Levy, supra note 2, at 337.
34
See Interview with 10th Cir. Judge (Feb. 24, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
35
Id.
36
To be precise, the first stop in the Fourth Circuit is actually the Clerk’s Office, which
looks for cases that will certainly need argument. The rest of the cases then go to the Office
of Staff Counsel before making it to the judges’ desks. Interview with 4th Cir. Judge (Jan. 14,
2022) (notes on file with editors).
37
See Interview with 1st Cir. Judge (Mar. 12, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview
with 5th Cir. Judge (Mar. 26, 2021) (notes on file with editors). That means that in these
circuits “staff attorneys are heavily involved in the screening process, determining which cases
will go on to oral argument and which cases will not.” Levy, supra note 2, at 339. As Merritt
McAlister notes in her skeptical take on the reliance on staff attorneys, such personnel “rarely
have any face time with the judges.” Merritt E. McAlister, “Downright Indifference”:
Examining Unpublished Decisions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 118 Mich. L. Rev. 533,
548 (2020).
38
Levy, supra note 2, at 334–35 (explaining how the D.C. Circuit screens cases); 5th Cir.
Internal Operating Proc.: Screening; 1st Cir. Internal Operating Proc. VII.
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relative difficulty of a case.39 The staff attorney’s office in San Francisco
servicing the Ninth Circuit, for example, houses eighty lawyers. They
execute an elaborate point system, assigning each case a number of points
depending on the complexity of the issues presented.40 The idea is to
distribute workload fairly among the judges, and they also use this process
to send the cases with a smaller point value to a “screening calendar”
likely not destined for oral argument. In the same vein, the staff attorney’s
office for the Fifth Circuit (numbering over fifty lawyers) has developed
subject matter expertise and not only screens cases but also circulates
subject-matter-specific memos used by law clerks in chambers.41
Oral argument practices within a circuit come with bragging rights. It
seems once a circuit has a reputation for being “an oral argument-heavy
joint,” the judges in that circuit come to cherish that reputation and wear
it as a badge of honor.42 Several of the judges we interviewed spoke of a
“tradition” and a “pride” that comes with arguing more cases than their
sister circuits, and another judge perceived criticism from judges outside
the circuit who thought hearing lots of argument was “indulgent.”43
2. Published / Unpublished Opinions
Another discernable difference between the circuits is the rate at which
they issue published versus unpublished opinions. “Unpublished
39

Levy, supra note 2, at 333.
9th Cir. Gen. Order 3.3(b) (“Cases ready for submission to a panel shall be screened by
case management attorneys, who shall designate issues, identify cases with similar issues, and
assign a numerical weight to each case. Drawing upon a computerized file of such cases, the
Clerk’s Office generates a prospective case list using a computer application that takes into
account, to the extent possible, the priorities set forth in [3.3(c)].”). Against the background
principle of selection according to the order of submission, Ninth Circuit General Order 3.3(c)
enumerates certain cases that have special priority, such as capital cases, direct criminal
appeals, civil appeals with statutory priority, and cases given priority by Ninth Circuit Rule
34-3. 9th Cir. Gen. Order 3.3(c).
41
See Interview with 5th Cir. Judge (Mar. 26, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
42
Streseman, supra note 28. For an example of judges bragging about their rate of oral
argument, see, e.g., Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second Circuit,
14 Hofstra L. Rev. 297, 303 (1986) (“Another unusual, and perhaps unique, Second Circuit
practice is that, with few exceptions, we allow and encourage oral argument of all appeals and
substantive motions, going so far in some instances as to refuse permission to submit an appeal
on the briefs alone.”).
43
Interview with 8th Cir. Judge (Mar. 12, 2021) (notes on file with editors) (noting
“tradition”); Interview with Fed. Cir. Judge (May 13, 2021) (notes on file with editors) (noting
“pride”); Interview with 2d Cir. Judge (Feb. 4, 2021) (notes on file with editors) (noting
criticisms of “indulgent” behavior).
40
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opinions,” of course, is a bit of a misnomer because virtually all federal
opinions are publicly accessible.44 But not all decisions of the courts of
appeals are given precedential weight, and often those non-precedential
decisions are called “unpublished.”
On this dimension we again see a variety from circuit to circuit as
reflected in the chart below,45 although—as Merritt McAlister
persuasively documents—all circuits have seen a dramatic rise in the use
of unpublished opinions over time.46
Publication Rates by Circuit
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Through interviews we learned of some unwritten norms that govern
the decision to write a published or an unpublished opinion. In the Third
Circuit, there is an unwritten rule against pursuing en banc review for a
decision with an unpublished opinion, and there is also a tradition of not
reversing a trial court in a decision made without first hearing oral
argument.47 The norm is slightly different in the Tenth, Fifth, and Seventh

44

For valuable discussion on the history and debate around unpublished opinions see
McAlister, supra note 37, at 533, 535 (arguing that the rise of unpublished decisions in federal
appellate courts unfairly denies indigent litigants access to the appeals process).
45
To determine publication rates, we extracted data for 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020 from
Federal Court Cases: FJC Integrated Database (IDB) 1970 to Present, Fed. Jud.
Ctr., https://www.fjc.gov/research/idb [https://perma.cc/FCW9-X327] (last visited Jan. 12,
2022). We determined publication status using the PUBSTAT field.
46
McAlister, supra note 37, at 549–50.
47
Interview with 3d Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
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Circuits; in those circuits the strong presumption is that argued cases
result in published opinions.48 In most circuits, however, there seems to
be a norm towards deferring to the wishes of the authoring judge as to
whether to publish or not, and this also appears to be a place for
negotiation (“I’ll join you but only if [it is] unpublished”).49
3. En Banc Practices
Our final case management distinction to highlight is actually the one
that drew our attention to circuit variation in the first place. All circuits
are subject to the same rule about when to go en banc (Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 35), but not all circuits go en banc at the same rate
or have the same internal practices for working around en bancs.50
In a prior article, we tracked en banc decisions for twelve circuits over
five decades.51 Although we were looking for partisan behavior (which
we analyzed and discussed in that article), we also noticed a significant
variation among the circuits. Below is a chart depicting variation in rates
of en banc decisions by circuit (adjusted for circuit size).52 Our data
reflects en banc decisions (more than 950) from the following years:
1966–1968, 1976–1978, 1986–1988, 1996–1998, 2006–2008, and 2016–
2020.53

48
In the Fifth Circuit at least this norm has been written down. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.2. (“An
opinion will be published unless each member of the panel deciding the case determines that
its publication is neither required nor justified under the criteria for publication. If any judge
of the court or any party so requests the panel will reconsider its decision not to publish an
opinion.”).
49
Interview with 4th Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
50
Rule 35 explains that en banc review is “not favored” but is allowed in two limited
circumstances: when “(1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity
of the court’s decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.”
Fed. R. App. P. 35(a).
51
See Devins & Larsen, supra note 8, at 1378–79. We omitted the Federal Circuit from that
study.
52
We wanted to account for differences in circuit size when comparing en banc rates. For
each circuit, we calculated the ratio in this chart by dividing the total number of en banc
opinions in our study by the average number of judges in that circuit. We obtained the number
of judges from Jon O. Newman, History of the Article III Appellate Courts, 1789–2021, at
19–24 (2021), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/31/Appellate%20Court%20
History%2012-14-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/WC2V-SYQB]. For each year in our study, we
counted the number of judges as of January 1st, then averaged the number of judges across all
years in our study.
53
For more on our methodology in that prior study, see Devins & Larsen, supra note 8, at
1405–07.
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It is important to remember that en banc is always a rare procedure, so
it is unwise to put too much stock into variations among rare, rarer, and
rarest. But a few interesting variations do stand out. The Second, First,
and Seventh Circuits historically seem the most reluctant to go en banc,
and this falls right in line with the norms and traditions they foster (and
brag about). The Fourth Circuit goes en banc the most frequently,
followed by the Ninth and Fifth Circuits.54 This variation also falls in line
with the stories we learned in our interviews. Some circuits (like the Fifth)
have dedicated en banc sittings and are not shy about calendaring and
expecting them, but others (like the Second) seem more hesitant to go en
banc.55
Beyond just a range in terms of reluctance, en banc personality traits
are also developed through the en banc work-arounds that various circuits

54

Due to its size, the Ninth Circuit rarely sits all together; rather, its en banc courts consist
of the Chief Judge and ten non-recused judges who are randomly drawn, and that procedure
is what is reflected in our chart here. See 9th Cir. R. 35-3.
55
Compare Interview with 8th Cir. Judge (Mar. 12, 2021) (reporting only two to three en
bancs per year), and Interview with 1st Cir. Judge (Mar. 12, 2021) (reporting that smaller
circuits, like the First, do not go en banc as often as other circuits), with Interview with 4th
Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (reporting no en banc limit and a recent increase in en banc
frequency), and Interview with 5th Cir. Judge (Apr. 30, 2021) (reporting that the Fifth Circuit
is not “en banc shy”).
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have implemented.56 The Seventh Circuit, for example, has adopted
something called a “Local Rule 40(e) circulation.”57 Under this rule, if
one panel thinks an earlier panel should be overruled or the panel decision
is going to create a conflict with another circuit, then the entire court votes
on whether to issue it. One judge we interviewed referred to this process
as a “paper en banc,” and explained that it is done entirely behind the
scenes, not at the behest of a party.58 A consequence of the paper en banc
is to limit the number of actual en bancs, a goal that seems accomplished
in the Seventh Circuit (as reflected in the chart above).
Other circuits—but certainly not all of them—circulate panel opinions
more generally. In the D.C. Circuit every opinion—published and
unpublished—gets circulated to the whole court.59 The same is true in the
Tenth Circuit, although the time between circulation and publication is
not long, and thus, it does not typically generate discussion.60 In the
Fourth Circuit, every opinion gets circulated to the full court, and indeed
every published opinion requires acknowledgment of receipt from every
active judge before it can be posted.61
We also learned of a practice—in the First Circuit, among others—of
circulating a panel opinion that is in tension with a prior opinion and then
dropping a footnote to indicate that all judges on the circuit were aware
of the conflict. This, we were told, has the purpose and effect of stopping
an en banc petition in its tracks.62 Similarly, the “mini en banc”—

56
Although all circuits agree en banc should be rare, the local rules vary a little bit in the
language use describing just how rare it should be. The Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits all
have a local rule that alters the Federal Rule slightly to state that en banc review should be
“extraordinary.” Alexandra Sadinsky, Note, Redefining En Banc Review in the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 2001, 2018 (2014). The First, Second, Fourth, Seventh,
Eighth, and D.C. Circuits do not amend or elaborate on the Federal Rule, and the Ninth Circuit
has its own unique process. Id. at 2019. Ninth Circuit en banc courts consist of the chief judge
and ten non-recused judges who are randomly drawn. 9th Cir. R. 35-3.
57
Interview with 7th Cir. Judge (Mar. 1, 2021) (notes on file with editors); see 7th Cir. R.
40(e).
58
Interview with 7th Cir. Judge (Mar. 1, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
59
D.C. Cir. Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures 55 (2021) (“Final drafts of all
opinions to be published also are circulated to all judges on the Court. Following circulation
of the drafts to the panel and the Court, the opinion is printed in house.”).
60
Interview with 10th Cir. Judge (Feb. 24, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
61
See Interview with 4th Cir. Judge (Jan. 14, 2022) (notes on file with editors).
62
Interview with 1st Cir. Judge (Mar. 12, 2021) (notes on file with editors) (explaining the
First Circuit’s practice of circulating panel opinions that are inconsistent with prior decisions
and noting that this practice is a way to indicate to the bar “that a petition to en banc would be
futile”).
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pioneered by the Second Circuit but later adopted by others—even allows
for overruling a precedent without a full en banc review if a majority of
the active judges agree behind the scenes.63 By one count, this mini en
banc process has been invoked more than seventy times in the past fifty
years.64
Of course, these en banc work-arounds (like the mini en banc) do have
the effect of channeling judicial disagreement into avenues the public
cannot see. We acknowledge these transparency costs, but we believe the
collegiality benefits outweigh them. There was a consensus among the
judges we interviewed that going en banc quickly gets nasty. Phrases used
to describe en banc include “always fraught” and “a mess.”65 One judge
we spoke to helpfully described a reason why. He explained that sitting
en banc means a judge approaches the case knowing there is already a
divide. This has a real effect on thinking, attitudes, and approaches to
consensus-building.66 There is thus a significant benefit to catching
judicial disagreement early and privately, while there is still time to iron
out differences, as opposed to initiating a public showdown where the
battle lines are already drawn.
Judge Sutton of the Sixth Circuit has publicly lamented a robust en
banc practice for a slightly different reason:
The judges of a circuit not only share the same title, pay and terms of
office, but they also agree to follow the same judicial oath, making them
all equally susceptible to error and making it odd to think of the

63
See Martin Flumenbaum & Brad S. Karp, The Rarity of En Banc Review in the Second
Circuit, N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 24, 2016), https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3679578/24august2
016flumenbaumkarp.pdf [https://perma.cc/33FM-7B42] (“The Second Circuit has generally
adopted the mini en banc procedure where consideration by the full court is statutorily
available but deemed unnecessary, such as when a panel concludes that intervening Supreme
Court authority has impliedly overruled Second Circuit precedent. Aside from the Seventh
Circuit (which has issued more than 270 mini en banc rulings), the Second Circuit has issued
more than twice as many mini en banc decisions as any of its sister circuits.” (footnotes
omitted)). For a description of the mini en banc process, see Steven M. Witzel & Samuel P.
Groner, Mini-En Banc Review in the Second Circuit, N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 7, 2016),
https://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/070011608%20Fried.pdf [https://perma.cc
/U8YD-M56Q].
64
Witzel & Groner, supra note 63.
65
Interview with 4th Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with
10th Cir. Judge (Feb. 24, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
66
Interview with 1st Cir. Judge (Mar. 12, 2021) (notes on file with editors).

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2022]

Circuit Personalities

1333

delegation of decisionmaking authority to panels of three as nothing
more than an audition.67

Perhaps for these reasons, circuits with lower en banc rates wear that
fact proudly.68 And circuits where en banc is on the rise are subjected to
criticism that judicial bonds of collegiality are fraying.69 Fourth Circuit
Judge Keenan, for example, fretted publicly that the inflammatory
language used in en banc dissents in her circuit was endangering their
“cherished tradition of civility.”70
Interestingly, we heard from several judges (appointed by Presidents
of different parties) that individual attitudes about going en banc change
over time regardless of ideology: judges new to the bench are more eager
to have an en banc sitting, and judges with more experience are reluctant
to go en banc.71 Time on the bench matters—or, as one judge put it, newer
judges are more likely to “have more fire” and time mellows out that
instinct regardless of ideological priors.72 This is a view widely shared by
the judges we interviewed who had been on the bench for a while, and
perhaps it indicates that en banc battle wounds are slow to heal.
B. Unique Interpersonal Customs
Putting aside case management differences among the circuits, our
interviews revealed other unique traits of the thirteen courts of appeals
67

John Ferroli, Sixth Circuit En Banc Decisions—2010, Mich. Bar J., June 2011, at 16,
https://www.sixthcircuitappellateblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/MI%20Bar%20Jour
nal.pdf [https://perma.cc/YBA5-68QV] (quoting Mitts v. Bagley, 626 F.3d 366, 370 (6th Cir.
2010) (Sutton, J., concurring)).
68
A well-known champion of this view is former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit Harry
Edwards, who made it a mission to change the culture of the court he inherited as Chief Judge.
See infra Section I.C; see also Ben Protess, As Wall Street Fights Regulation, It Has Backup
on the Bench, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 2012, at F2 (connecting Chief Judge Edwards’s approach
to collegiality with fewer en banc sittings).
69
See, e.g., Patrick M. Kane, Denial of Emergency Motion Spawns Four Opinions from the
Fourth Circuit, N.C. App. Prac. Blog (Oct. 21, 2020), https://ncapb.foxrothschild.com/20
20/10/21/denial-of-emergency-motion-spawns-four-opinions-from-the-fourth-circuit/# [https
://perma.cc/RC3G-4N2N] (“If you follow the Fourth Circuit, you know that there has been a
noticeable increase in the number of en banc cases that the Court has taken, and in those cases
there has been some sharp disagreement between the Judges.”).
70
Manning v. Caldwell, 930 F.3d 264, 286 (4th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Keenan, J.,
concurring); see also Green, supra note 12 (connecting increased en banc activity on the Fourth
Circuit to growing partisanship and discord).
71
Interview with 6th Cir. Judge (Apr. 20, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with
11th Cir. Judge (Apr. 1, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
72
Interview with 11th Cir. Judge (Apr. 1, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
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that relate more to the interpersonal component of appellate judging.
Variation in interpersonal customs (including and especially how often—
if ever—judges travel to hear oral argument) is perhaps the most
significant difference affecting the daily lives of federal appellate judges.
We focus on two customs—face-to-face communication and opinion
writing.
1. Face-to-Face Communication
Conducting our interviews during the COVID pandemic led to some
interesting observations: the judges who sit in circuits with traditions of
dinners out and organized events really missed these practices in 2020.
This seemed particularly true of the judges who sit in circuits where they
must travel to hear argument.73 The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has a
history of all-judges dinners during the week they travel for Court
Week.74 And, because they don’t always sit in the same city to hear
arguments, there is a fun tradition of exploring new restaurants and parts
of a city or going back to tried and true haunts like one does on vacation.
The Fourth Circuit has a similar custom of dining out during court weeks
in Richmond—the judges have lunch with their co-panelists every day,
and they dine with other chambers (including the law clerks) many
evenings at regular spots they cherish.75
By contrast, judges on the D.C. Circuit lamented that they may be less
connected with one another since they all sit in the same city where they
live and thus the socializing traditions in other circuits do not happen
without effort (although several chief judges, as discussed below, have
made this effort).76 And similarly, we learned that because judges on the
Seventh Circuit all commute to Chicago these days, their old tradition of
lunch after argument has fallen out of favor in order to ease the
commutes—a loss that the judges feel acutely because of a real need to
have regular “non-case-related personal chats” with colleagues.77

73

See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
Interview with 11th Cir. Judge (Jan. 27, 2021) (notes on file with editors) (describing alljudges lunches and dinners during court week as a “tradition” that is “engrained in the culture
but not formalized”).
75
Interview with 4th Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
76
Interview with D.C. Cir. Judge (Feb. 3, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with
D.C. Cir. Judge (Mar. 17, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with D.C. Cir. Judge
(Apr. 19, 2021) (notes on file with editors); see infra notes 114–22 and accompanying text.
77
Interview with 7th Cir. Judge (Mar. 1, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
74
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In fact, a strong norm in most socializing traditions, we learned, is “no
case talk.”78 The goal instead, as one judge put it, is to learn to see one’s
colleagues as human beings, and not as opponents “in combat.”79 For this
reason, many of the judges seem to put a premium on exploring fun
locations together as friends. This was particularly true of judges who
tend to sit in vacation destinations; a few locations that came up in our
conversations were: Miami (Eleventh Circuit), New Orleans (Fifth
Circuit), Santa Fe (Tenth Circuit) and San Juan (First Circuit).80 Indeed,
Judge Costa on the Fifth Circuit recently joked on a podcast that “I got a
lot of good advice on how to be a Fifth Circuit judge, but the advice they
were most passionate about was which restaurants to eat at in New
Orleans.”81 And another judge explained to us he has learned over the
years that “[b]reaking bread and cocktails adds to affection.”82 In a 2016
speech at the University of Chicago Law School, Judge Harris, of the
Fourth Circuit, observed that lunches and dinners are “a key ritual of
collegiality making manifest that the disagreements about cases have no
consequences for our personal interactions.”83
It is important to emphasize that the value of this socializing is not just
to make life nicer for the judges (although that is certainly true).
Collegiality, as D.C. Circuit Judge Edwards explains, “is a process that
helps to create the conditions for principled agreement.”84 Several judges
specifically tied these customs of dining out with the act of effective

78

Interview with D.C. Cir. Judge (Apr. 19, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
Interview with D.C. Cir. Judge (Mar. 17, 2021) (notes on file with editors) (reporting that
efforts to increase collegiality helped judges see one another as “human beings”); Interview
with 4th Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors) (reporting that the decrease in
collegial events due to COVID has made everything feel like “combat”).
80
See, e.g., Interview with 5th Cir. Judge (Mar. 26, 2021) (notes on file with editors) (New
Orleans); Interview with 10th Cir. Judge (Feb. 24, 2021) (notes on file with editors) (Santa
Fe).
81
D. Todd Smith, A Peek Into Life on the Fifth Circuit Bench: Judge Gregg Costa, Tex.
App. L. Podcast, at 23:38 (Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.butlersnow.com/2020/10/a-peek-intolife-on-the-fifth-circuit-bench-judge-gregg-costa/ [https://perma.cc/65KF-E3GQ]. Another
Fifth Circuit judge told us that the practice of inviting visiting judges from other circuits to sit
on Fifth Circuit cases was suspended, in part, because of the number of out-of-circuit judges
interested in turning their sitting into a vacation. See Interview with 5th Cir. Judge (Mar. 26,
2021) (notes on file with editors).
82
Interview with 11th Cir. Judge (Apr. 1, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
83
Maura Levine, Inside the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals: How Collegiality Works, Univ.
Chi. L. Sch. (May 19, 2016), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/inside-fourth-circuit-courtappeals-how-collegiality-works [https://perma.cc/X3H7-V9KZ].
84
Edwards, supra note 4, at 84.
79

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1336

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:1315

judicial decision making.85 One judge lamented the loss of this
collegiality as COVID took its toll on the socializing which resulted in
“nastier” discourse.86 “Knowing each other as people,” that judge
explained, “is necessary to collegial collective decision making.”87 It can
even make one more likely to dissent because “[d]issent happens in part
because you know you will all be friends later.”88 Another judge
emphasized that he does not “believe in fighting for collegiality for
collegiality’s sake.”89 Instead, he explained, liking one’s colleagues
makes it easier “to find common ground, to listen to each other, to respect
precedent”—at bottom, it just makes for “better decisions” at the end of
the day.90
In her 2016 speech Judge Harris put it this way:
For me, collegiality means embracing, not chafing at, the collective
nature of appellate decision-making. It’s “leaning in” to making
decisions in active engagement with your colleagues: Knowing each
other; really listening to and respecting each other’s views; being
willing to be persuaded and also to persuade, to be part of that dialogue.
This is a genuine choice . . . [and] [a] very substantive conception of
the role of an appellate judge, in which reaching decisions through
interaction is central to the job.91

There are other important unique interpersonal norms in the circuits
that are meant to build collegiality but do not involve eating out. In some
circuits—like the Seventh or First—the small size makes it possible for

85

See Interview with 4th Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors) (“Knowing
each other as people is necessary to collegial collective decision making.”); Interview with 2d
Cir. Judge (Feb. 4, 2021) (notes on file with editors) (talking about dinners with colleagues
during which they discussed history and traditions of the court); Interview with Fed. Cir. Judge
(May 13, 2021) (notes on file with editors) (explaining how a court’s tradition of collegiality
may mitigate aggressively toned opinions).
86
Interview with 4th Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Interview with 6th Cir. Judge (Apr. 30, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
90
Id. For similar sentiments from a variety of judges, see Statements from the Court about
the Passing of Judge Stephen F. Williams, U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the D.C. Cir.,
https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/Content/Announcement+-+Statement+fro
m+the+Court+about+the+Passing+of+Judge+Stephen+F.+Williams [https://perma.cc/4TBQ
-6VRH] (last visited Jan. 3, 2021) (including Judge Tatel’s view that “[c]ollegiality is critical
to effective appellate judging”).
91
Edwards, supra note 4, at 76 (alterations in original) (quoting Judge Harris).
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every judge to sit an equal number of times with every other judge.92 This
is a norm specifically designed to combat fractions, cliques, and group
think. The D.C. Circuit, under Judge Edwards’s leadership, also made this
a formal rule: “[E]very judge must sit with every other active judge on the
court at least four times in a term.”93 Repetitive active engagement with
judges appointed by a different President seems critical to establishing
rapport.
We also found a significant divergence in the nature of that rapport—
particularly as it relates to case discussion. The Eighth, Fourth, and D.C.
Circuits favor a more formal method of discussing cases—they circulate
memos and do not discuss the cases before argument (indeed Eighth
Circuit judges, we discovered, rarely even email each other, opting
instead to exchange written memos).94 Judges in other circuits described
this formal exchange of views as a little old-fashioned and indicated that
the trend was changing in favor of more informal discussions of cases
before argument.95 In fact, one judge praised this new development
because it helps to “promote agreement,” “issue spot,” and “narrow
disagreement.”96
2. Opinion Writing
Judges on several circuits flagged strong norms in the editing process:
specifically, a recognition that judges should not call attention to
differences in one another’s choice of legal reasoning or writing styles.
For example, judges on the Third, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits mentioned to
us that there is a long-standing custom of using a light editing touch and
giving discretion to the authoring judge in terms of structure and style on
how the opinion should be written.97 As an extreme example of this

92

Indeed, the Seventh Circuit guarantees that sort of random panel assignment with an
algorithm that ensures every judge sits with every other judge an equal number of times. See
interview with 7th Cir. Judge (Mar. 1, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
93
Edwards, supra note 4, at 85.
94
Interview with 8th Cir. Judge (Mar. 12, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with
4th Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with D.C. Cir. Judge (Feb.
3, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
95
Interview with 1st Cir. Judge (Mar. 12, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with
3d Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
96
Interview with 3d Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
97
Interview with 3d Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with
4th Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with D.C. Cir. Judge (Feb.
3, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
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deference, Fourth Circuit judges apparently used to be discouraged from
saying anything more than “affirm” or “reverse” in conference, leaving
the rest of the reasoning in the hands of the assigned author.98 Even today,
we were told, all communications about draft opinions contain a
“diplomatic politeness,” with praise to the author and use of a passive
voice to offer a constructive solution to any conflict. It is frowned upon
in most circuits to use “flashy,” “testy” language or words that “[make]
us sound like we are at war.”99 Even red-lining a draft is seen by some as
too aggressive. These editing norms, we were told, are critical to limiting
moments for tension or flare-ups of disagreement.100
Similarly, several circuits have developed their own rules and timelines
about when they must circulate their drafts and (perhaps more
importantly) respond to other drafts. Judge Edwards is perhaps most
famous for instituting this rule in the D.C. Circuit.101 Along with Judge
Wald, he set mandatory deadlines for when the judges were required to
respond to each other, which “had a tremendous effect on improving
interactions among the members of the court.”102 Several circuits also
circulate a list every month of opinions not yet released, indicating who
is waiting on whom to write a separate opinion or cast their vote so the
decision can be released.103 Judges we spoke to were uniformly afraid of
being named on that list. The Tenth Circuit actually rewards timeliness in
completion of work in an amusing way: judges who get their work done
on time are happily assigned to a sitting over the summer in Santa Fe.104
Most judges seemed to agree that morale is higher when circuit
productivity is up.105 Another way to think of it is that a judge gets grumpy
or resentful when forced to wait on another judge for months before
98

Interview with 4th Cir. Judge (Jan. 14, 2022) (notes on file with editors); Interview with
3d Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
99
Interview with 3d Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with
9th Cir. Judge (Apr. 28, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with D.C. Cir. Judge
(Mar. 17, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
100
Interview with 3d Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with
4th Cir. Judge (Jan. 14, 2022) (notes on file with editors).
101
Edwards, supra note 4, at 85–86.
102
Id.
103
See, e.g., Interview with 10th Cir. Judge (Feb. 24, 2021) (notes on file with editors)
(every month a list of outstanding opinions and assignments is circulated); Interview with 2d
Cir. Judge (Feb. 4, 2021) (notes on file with editors) (four times a year, a list is circulated with
case status and assignments).
104
Interview with 10th Cir. Judge (Feb. 24, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
105
See, e.g., id.
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getting their work done. Eliminating that intersection of disagreement is
one way to smooth the path for collegial interaction.
Finally, law clerk dynamics seem to vary from circuit to circuit. Some
courts (like the D.C. Circuit) have a tradition of a law clerk network—
where law clerks serve as almost ambassadors from chambers to
chambers.106 Other courts frown on this channel of communication. The
Ninth and the Fifth Circuits—likely due to their large sizes—have a role
for law clerks that we did not find in other circuits. Law clerks in those
jurisdictions author bench memos that are shared, or “pooled,” among the
various chambers.107 The presiding judge then makes bench memo
assignments before argument, and the memos are circulated to the other
judges on the panel. At least one judge we spoke to did not favor this
tradition of “forced pooling” but shared that he did it because he was
highly discouraged by other judges from breaking tradition.108
An interesting question is where these norms and traditions come from,
as many of them are not enshrined in the operating procedures. We
learned from our interviews that the only way for new judges to figure out
how their court really operated was to ask a colleague who was more
senior. There is a “cultural transfer,” in the words of one judge, that
happens from one generation to the next.109 Stories are shared of older
judges from “our Court,” and even the courthouse design becomes a
talking point and a shared treasure.110 This transmission of norms and
traditions is understandably easier with smaller-sized circuits. Because
the smaller circuits have continuous and repetitive interactions with each
other, the emphasis on collegiality has real social consequences. In the
words of one judge (on the First Circuit), “it is easy to have a virtuous
circle when small.”111
And while norms certainly evolve over time, several judges that are
newer to the bench expressed to us that they were specifically advised
upon arrival not to rock the boat.112 One amusing anecdote we heard
106

Interview with D.C. Cir. Judge (Apr. 19, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
Interview with 9th Cir. Judge (Apr. 28, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with
5th Cir. Judge (Apr. 30, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
108
Interview with 5th Cir. Judge (Apr. 30, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
109
Interview with 2d Cir. Judge (Feb. 4, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
110
Interview with 3d Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with
5th Cir. Judge (Mar. 26, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
111
Interview with 1st Cir. Judge (Mar. 12, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
112
Interview with 5th Cir. Judge (Apr. 30, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with
4th Cir. Judge (Jan. 14, 2022) (notes on file with editors).
107
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involved a new judge suggesting gently that maybe Word Perfect was not
the best processing system to use nowadays. This judge apparently caused
a firestorm over such a bold suggestion and concluded that one does not
want to be the new judge who arrives to a circuit armed with suggestions
about how things ought to be done.113
C. Instances of Circuit Personality Changes
Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the existence and effect of circuit
personalities is to describe moments in time where a circuit seems to
affirmatively act to change its personality. Our research unearthed two
such instances: the D.C. Circuit in the mid-1990s and the Sixth Circuit in
the early 2000s. In both cases, judges who had previously been at
loggerheads with each other found a path to overcome (typically)
ideological rifts by embracing their circuit identity.
1. D.C. Circuit
Virtually everyone agrees that the D.C. Circuit change is largely
attributable to one man: Judge Edwards, who was appointed to the D.C.
Circuit in 1980 and became Chief Judge of the court in 1994.114 Judge
Edwards has written about his early days on the bench of what he calls a
“broken [circuit] for want of collegiality.”115 He recalls:
During my first day as a member of the court, I was greeted by one of
the senior members of the court who, after saying ‘hello,’ asked, ‘Can
I count on your vote?’ I was floored by the question. I responded that
he could count on my vote only on those occasions when we agreed on
how a case should be decided. I came to understand, however, that—in
113
Interview with 4th Cir. Judge (Jan. 14, 2022) (notes on file with editors) (recounting this
story about a colleague from another circuit).
114
Harris, supra note 9, at 78 (“Restoring a sense of community and collegiality was very
important to Judge Edwards, especially when he became chief judge in 1994. Most observers
rightly credit Judge Edwards with helping to restore a more cooperative and collegial culture
on the D.C. Circuit, and he has gone on to write and speak extensively about the importance
of judicial collegiality.”). See generally United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, Harry T. Edwards, https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/content/VL+
-+Judges+-+HTE [https://perma.cc/V77Y-MK7F] (providing a short biography of Judge
Edwards).
115
Edwards, supra note 4, at 84. For an account of the bitter lines of division among liberal
and conservative judges on the D.C. Circuit in the early 1970s (including the refusal of liberals
and conservatives to sit with one another over lunch), see Joseph C. Goulden, The
Benchwarmers: The Private World of Powerful Federal Judges 250–90 (1974).

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2022]

Circuit Personalities

1341

those days—the DC Circuit was ideologically divided on many
issues . . . . Judges of similar political persuasions too often sided with
one another (say, on petitions for en banc review) largely out of partisan
loyalty. We dissented more, and we were more inclined to rehear cases
en banc . . . [and were] distrustful of one another’s motivations.116

Judge Edwards was convinced that the lack of collegiality and
nastiness he witnessed on his court was simply no way to run a railroad.
Importantly, he was not just worried about the daily toll that accompanies
conflict. Instead, he said that without collegiality, the actual outputs of a
court suffer: when judges hate each other they are “less receptive to ideas
about pending cases and to comments on circulating opinions; and they
stubbornly cling to their first impressions of an issue, often readily
dismissing suggestions that would produce a stronger opinion or a better
result.”117 The toxic atmosphere that Judge Edwards inherited when he
joined the D.C. Circuit, in other words, inhibited their ability to “get[] the
law right.”118
And so, once Judge Edwards became chief judge in 1994, he decided
to make some changes—both to the written rules and to the unwritten
norms governing the circuit. First, as alluded to above, he championed a
change to the case-assignment system so that every active judge sat with
every other active judge on the court at least four times a term. Second,
he convinced the rest of the court to all but eliminate reliance on visiting
judges (except in an emergency) so as to maximize the time active judges
spent with each other. And third, he instituted time limits for when the
judges had to respond to one another’s draft opinions. Together, these rule
changes helped “structure the paths” to collaboration and had a
“tremendous effect on improving interactions among the members of the
court.”119
The judges we interviewed on the D.C. Circuit all agreed that these
changes made a great difference, but they also credited more subtle moves
by Judge Edwards that changed the culture of the court. Judge Edwards
initiated a champagne toast at the end of the year, for example, and he

116

Edwards, supra note 4, at 84–85.
Id. at 85.
118
Harry T. Edwards, A Conversation with Judge Harry T. Edwards, 16 Wash. U. J.L. &
Pol’y 61, 63 (2004).
119
Edwards, supra note 4, at 85–86.
117
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purchased birthday gifts and delivered them to each judge annually.120
With rule adjustments, deliberate acts of kindness, and purposeful
socializing, Judge Edwards managed a circuit personality change at the
D.C. Circuit.
This story was repeated to us by many different judges (both on and
off the D.C. Circuit), but we were also able to also see it borne out in data.
Although admittedly not a perfect proxy for collegiality, one measurable
feature of potential discord among circuit court judges is the number of
times they sit en banc. As described above, going en banc is a fraught
process, so much so that several circuits have designed ways to
affirmatively avoid it.121 If one looks at the number of times the D.C.
Circuit went en banc before and after Judge Edwards’ efforts were
implemented, a striking pattern emerges.122

120

Interview with D.C. Cir. Judge (Mar. 17, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview
with D.C. Cir. Judge (Apr. 19, 2021) (notes on file with editors); see also Edwards, supra note
4, at 89 (“[T]he judges in a number of circuits arrange events that allow members of the court
to engage with one another in settings outside of the courtroom.”). For example, professionals
are often invited to have relaxed lunches with the judges on the D.C. Circuit. At the end of
each term, the chief judge will host a gathering with champagne. Id.
121
See supra Subsection I.A.3.
122
This data was collected as part of a separate project in which we examined approximately
950 en banc decisions over six decades, looking for evidence of “weaponizing” en banc in
partisan ways. For a detailed discussion of the methodology and data collection, see Devins
& Larsen, supra note 8, at 1405.
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Number of En Banc Cases in the D.C. Circuit
1986–2008
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1986-88

1996-98

2006-08

DC Cir.

As the above figure demonstrates, the number of en banc sittings
decreased rather significantly after Judge Edwards became chief judge in
1994 (and with a little time for his rule changes and norm changes to sink
in).
To be sure, there are many reasons en banc decisions could decline—
docket changes, or personnel changes for example. We were able,
however, to parse these en banc decisions closely looking for signs of
discord. We coded which of these en banc decisions could be labeled
“partisan” either because the decision splits along lines of appointing
President or because the circuit went en banc to course-correct for a
renegade panel composed of judges appointed by the minority party.123
As the next figure demonstrates, this partisan behavior in D.C. Circuit
en banc decisions also decreased around the same time Judge Edwards
attempted to change circuit personality. In fact, from 2006–2008—once
123
As explained in our earlier paper, we defined a “partisan split” as divided en banc
decisions where at least ninety percent of the judges voted in line with other judges appointed
by Presidents of the same political party and against those nominated by the other party. Id. at
1379. We separately identified a “partisan reversal” if “four conditions were met: (1) the panel
opinion is reversed, (2) most judges in the panel majority opinion are from the minority party
(the party that is not dominant in the circuit at the time), (3) most majority party judges vote
to reverse the panel en banc, and (4) most minority party judges dissent en banc.” Id. at 1407.
For an in-depth discussion on how this data was collected, see id. at 1405.

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1344

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:1315

the personality change was complete—the number of cases that we
labeled partisan in the D.C. Circuit dropped to zero.
Number of Cases with Partisan Splits or Partisan
Reversals in the D.C. Circuit 1986–2008
3

2

1

0
1986-88

1996-98

2006-08

DC Cir.

2. Sixth Circuit
A similar personality change can be seen at the Sixth Circuit in the
early 2000s. The narrative begins with the highly contentious affirmative
action cases from the University of Michigan that culminated in the
Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger decisions (decided in the Sixth
Circuit in 2002 and the U.S. Supreme Court in 2003).124 The disagreement
between the judges extended far beyond the merits of the cases and
included claims of judicial misconduct and shenanigans involving
opinion assignment and the timing of en banc review.125
124
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that University of Michigan Law
School’s affirmative action policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (holding that the University of Michigan’s affirmative action
admissions policy for first-year students violated the Equal Protection Clause).
125
Sixth Circuitry, Wall St. J. (May 17, 2002, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB1021591705602440320 [https://perma.cc/5MYP-3HXG] (“According to Judge Boggs’s
account, corroborated by another judge, Judge Martin assigned himself to the three-judge
panel that was considering Grutter, bypassing the usual random-selection process. He then
delayed telling the court, which then had 11 active members, that the [party] had petitioned
for a full-court or en banc review. Instead, he waited until two Republican-appointed judges
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Whether the affirmative action fights were the cause of the nastiness or
just a symptom of a preexisting dynamic, the contentiousness of this
episode spilled over to infect the rest of the Sixth Circuit and led to such
a tremendous dip in collegiality that the judges were said not to be able to
sit in the same room with one another.126 Indeed, in the words of New
York Times reporter Adam Liptak, the Sixth Circuit was “surely the most
dysfunctional federal appeals court in the nation . . . [and] relations
among the judges on the Sixth Circuit [had] been marred by venomous
discord for at least a decade, mostly along ideological lines.”127
Today, twenty years later, the Sixth Circuit has gone through some
significant personnel changes, and they have also instituted some new
traditions. For one thing, like the D.C. Circuit in the 1990s, the Sixth
Circuit has changed some rules. Bothered that for years they were the
circuit with the slowest pace of case disposition, they decided to speed
things up. They altered the way cases were assigned, and they delegated
the decision whether to have oral argument to the three-judge panel (under
the old rule, the judges heard oral argument in every counseled case).128
The changes worked. The median interval from notice of appeal to final
disposition on the Sixth Circuit dropped from 14.2 months in 2008 to 8.3
months in 2018.129 And the rule change did more than just alter the Sixth
Circuit’s reputation as a slow mover. Just like Judge Edwards discovered
on the D.C. Circuit, streamlining the pace of case disposition brings real
collegiality benefits—it limits the potential strain that arises when one
judge is waiting on another to get his opinions out. Perhaps unavoidable
ideological conflict is aggravated when judicial colleagues believe their
work is being held up by a dissent.
The Sixth Circuit also instituted a “joviality committee” and some new
social traditions: happy hour once a week, an annual riverboat tour, and a
had taken senior status, thereby losing the right to sit in an en banc hearing. It’s not unusual
for judges to time their move to senior status so that they can participate in cases that interest
them and it’s reasonable to assume that Grutter, which dealt with one of the most contentious
legal issues of the day, would have been such a case.”).
126
See interview with 10th Cir. Judge (Feb. 24, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
127
Adam Liptak, Weighing the Place of a Judge in a Club of 600 White Men, N.Y. Times
(May 16, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/17/us/17bar.html [https://perma.cc/8UQ
T-YZNW].
128
See Interview with 6th Cir. Judge (Apr. 30, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
129
We obtained this figure by comparing data from 2008 and 2018 found in Caseload
Statistics Data Tables, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts tbl.B-4A, https://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-data-tables [https://perma.cc/L3S7-JUM4] (last visited
Jan. 13, 2022). The years reflect the twelve-month periods ending September 30.
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Reds baseball game (with staff).130 From all accounts, these changes (and
likely the personnel changes that occurred as well) seem to work towards
improving life on the Sixth Circuit. Indeed, very recently the judges on
the Sixth Circuit nominated their colleague Judge Cole (chief judge from
2014–2021) to receive the prestigious American Inns of Court
Professionalism Award. According to Judge Griffin, who wrote the
nomination letter, Judge Cole deserved praise for “reviving the court’s
collegiality.”131
Once again, the en banc data we collected reinforces this story of
personality change in the Sixth Circuit. In 2016–2018 the Sixth Circuit
went en banc far less frequently than it had ten years earlier (indeed the
number of en bancs dropped in half).132 And perhaps even more
importantly, those ten years also saw a dramatic drop in the number of
partisan splits/partisan reversals in Sixth Circuit en bancs. The number
fell from thirteen in 2006–2008 to three in 2016–2018.

130

See interview with 6th Cir. Judge (Apr. 30, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
Press Release, Am. Inns of Ct., Judge R. Guy Cole Jr. to receive the 2021 American Inns
of Court Professionalism Award for the Sixth Circuit (Sept. 27, 2021), https://www.bu
sinesswire.com/news/home/20210927005026/en/ [https://perma.cc/X9U6-RBVA]. Keeping
with this trend of bipartisan nominations of colleagues, in 2021 Judge Julia Gibbons of the
Sixth Circuit won the Devitt Award—the highest award in the federal judiciary—after having
been nominated by all of her Sixth Circuit colleagues. Press Release, The Dwight D.
Opperman Found., American Judiciary’s Highest Honor Bestowed on Judge Julia Smith
Gibbons, (Oct. 07, 2021, 6:00 ET), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/americanjudiciarys-highest-honor-bestowed-on-judge-julia-smith-gibbons-301394559.html [https://pe
rma.cc/7LJB-SYBS].
132
This data depicted in these two charts was collected for our previous article, Weaponizing
En Banc, supra note 8. For an in-depth discussion on the methodology used to collect these en
banc decisions, see id. at 1405–07.
131
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Of course, as with the personality of an individual, circuit personalities
are influenced by a multitude of factors that can change over time. These
include the size of a circuit, the amount of time the judges have served on
the bench, dockets that present divisive or non-ideological cases, and, of
course, judicial temperament. By describing the personality features we
discovered about the circuits we do not mean to imply they are static or
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impervious to change by the specific people that join the flock. Our point
is simply that these circuit-specific norms and rules do considerable work
in influencing the daily life and motivations of an individual federal
appeals judge—and this holds true regardless of the President appointing
that judge.
II. WHY CIRCUIT PERSONALITIES MATTER
What is the significance of these circuit personalities beyond
entertaining behind-the-scenes storytelling? It is to that question that we
now turn. In Part III and the Conclusion, we will examine the rise of
nationalization and how circuit personalities mitigate ideological
polarization. Before turning to those matters, we have other important
work to do. We need to provide richer accounts both of judging on the
federal courts of appeals and why it is that federal appeals judges care so
much about their status before legal audiences. Circuit personalities
matter, put simply, because they foster a unique model of deciding cases,
and because they facilitate a community for judges who care deeply about
their reputations for honoring the rule of law.
A. Unique Model of Judging on the Courts of Appeals
Federal courts of appeals judges are often lumped together with U.S.
Supreme Court Justices particularly when it comes time to evaluate
politics in judging.133 President Donald Trump’s staggering fifty-four
appointees to the federal courts of appeals, for example, have been called
a group of “battle-tested conservatives” who—along with the three
Trump-appointed Justices—are on the bench to “advance a ‘particular
agenda.’” 134
Whatever the merits of these warnings, they overlook a very important
fact: the model of decision making in the courts of appeals is different
from the model featured prominently in the U.S. Supreme Court. To be
sure, appellate judges and Supreme Court Justices are all engaged in

133
Debbie Stabenow, Chuck Schumer & Sheldon Whitehouse, Captured Courts: The GOP’s
Big Money Assault on The Constitution, Our Independent Judiciary and the Rule of Law 1, 3
(2020); see also Edwards, supra note 4, at 61 (“Too often scholars, members of the media, and
other interested persons mistakenly think that the work of the Courts of Appeals can be
measured by reference to the decision-making practices of the Supreme Court.”).
134
Ruiz et al., supra note 14.
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collective decision making, but there are features of this collective process
in the lower courts that stand apart.
First and most obviously, federal appellate judges hear cases in
randomly assigned panels of three that continuously shuffle. This makes
them different from any other type of federal judge—certainly the district
court judge who speaks alone, but also the Supreme Court Justice who
always tangles with the same eight people. Appeals judges, by contrast,
rarely speak for themselves, and their partners in decision making vary
from week to week. This model of judging assumes that any panel of three
people can deliver a legitimate decision for the circuit as a whole.
Further, because judges deliberate cases together in different
combinations throughout the year, a dissenter on today’s panel may need
a vote from the same judge to make a majority tomorrow. And this sort
of “across the aisle” consensus is quite possible in the federal appellate
courts. Unlike the Supreme Court docket where most of the cases, almost
by definition, defy an easy answer, the dockets in the courts of appeals
contain far fewer cases that inevitably divide by ideology.135 Consensus
and compromise, in other words, are within reach and are part and parcel
of the appellate court decision-making model.136 More than that, there is
real pressure to decide cases in a timely manner. Dissents and
concurrences take time and, as such, present challenges to court
administration as well as collegial decision making. As we were told by
several judges, consensus goes hand-in-hand with avoiding the pinch of a
crowded docket.137
For this model to work the judges must foster relationships with
colleagues. They must confront the reality that they are no longer
committed soldiers dedicated to national causes. Instead, they face
pressure to adopt a new sort of loyalty—a circuit loyalty—simply in order
to get their work done. As Judge Edwards put it, federal appellate judges
“respect the work and abilities of their colleagues with whom they share
equal authority and a common commitment to ‘getting the law right.’” 138
135

This means, in the words of Judge Edwards, “[t]he majority of the cases in the circuit
courts admit of a right or a best answer,” regardless of ideological differences. Edwards, supra
note 4, at 61.
136
See id.
137
See Interview with 3d Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors) (explaining
that a judge authoring too many dissents or requesting too many en bancs risks alienating
others); see also Interview with D.C. Cir. Judge (Feb. 3, 2021) (notes on files with editors)
(noting that dissents are seen as extra work and the court values consensus).
138
Edwards, supra note 4, at 65.
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Of course, none of this means that appellate judges lose their
ideological priors when donning the robe (the priors that, in part, got them
the job to begin with), but it does mean these judges must start to see
themselves as adopted into a new family of sorts. This requires the judges
to buy into a “whole is more than the sum of its parts” mentality. And
they largely do. In the words of Judge Katzmann (who tragically passed
away during the writing of this article):
We come from all different kinds of backgrounds, but we’re playing off
the same score. Musicians are part of an orchestra; there’s a common
language. Were judges to become involved in partisan disputes, we
would devalue the institution we serve, and we are very careful to avoid
that kind of language and rhetoric.139

Another unique feature of federal appellate decision making (compared
to the Supreme Court) is that decisions are made with relative anonymity.
Federal appellate judges are not often recognized on the street, they are
unlikely to be household names (even among lawyers), and they do not
generally boast nicknames, go on book tours, or inspire internet memes,
bobbleheads, or jewelry.140 There is freedom that comes from this
obscurity. An appeals judge is less likely than a Supreme Court Justice to
face pressure in terms of needing to stay consistent in individual views
over time (what one of us has called a “self stare decisis”).141 They can
perhaps afford to meet a colleague in the middle, or on a narrower ground
without facing scathing criticism about being a traitor to a cause.142 And,
because the docket of cases a federal appeals judge faces is more
constrained by precedent than a typical Supreme Court case, and more
open in terms of preserved issues available to resolve the case, there are

139

Jesse Wegman, Opinion, A Humane Judge, Gone Too Soon, N.Y. Times (June 11, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/11/opinion/Robert-Katzmann-judge-dead.amp.html [https
://perma.cc/3PZC-FHBG].
140
For discussion of this phenomenon, see Hasen, supra note 5 (chronicling the ebbs and
flows of Supreme Court Justice celebrity).
141
Allison Orr Larsen, Perpetual Dissents, 15 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 447, 469 (2008).
142
For an example of this latter dynamic at the Supreme Court, consider the reaction from
social conservatives when Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion in Bostock v. Clayton
County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020), finding “sex discrimination” in Title VII to incorporate
employment discrimination based on gender identity or sexual orientation. See Jane Coaston,
Social Conservatives Feel Betrayed by the Supreme Court—and the GOP that Appointed it,
Vox (July 1, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/7/1/21293370/supreme-court-conservatismbostock-lgbtq-republicans [https://perma.cc/K8XM-LB8A].
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more moves for a federal appellate judge to make in order to generate
consensus.
This is where collegiality and circuit personalities really do work in
terms of the decisions that are rendered at the end of the day. In Judge
Edwards’s words:
[J]udges have a common interest . . . in getting the law right, and that,
as a result, we are willing to listen, persuade, and be persuaded, all in
an atmosphere of civility and respect. Collegiality is a process that helps
to create the conditions for principled agreement, by allowing all points
of view to be aired and considered.143

Similarly, Judge Harris underscores this value of collegiality when
talking about Judge Edwards (for whom she clerked):
Judge Edwards always makes clear that by “collegiality,” he has in
mind something more than friendly and civil relationships among
judges. There is overlap, of course; Judge Edwards treasures his
friendships with his colleagues and understands that civility in
disagreement is a precondition of any healthy collaboration. But when
Judge Edwards talks about collegiality, he is describing a very
substantive conception of the role of an appellate judge, in which
reaching decisions through interaction is central to the job. 144

This interaction—that which Judge Harris says is central to the job—
is exactly what makes circuit personalities so critical. The model of
judging in the courts of appeals assumes that decisions are better when
deliberated and that deliberation is better when collegial. Because
successful appellate judging depends on repeat interactions with people
who may not always see the law the same way, loyalty to the group and
dedication to the enterprise is key.
B. Motivations of Federal Appellate Judges
We have just described a model of judging on the federal courts of
appeals that is uniquely collegial, a model in which circuit personalities
reinforce critical collegial bonds. But why do we think that federal
appeals judges are committed to this model of judging? In today’s hyper
143

Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decision Making, 151 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1639, 1645 (2003).
144
Harris, supra note 9, at 78.
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polarized world, why would appellate judges not see themselves as
ideological warriors willing, if need be, to repudiate collegiality in order
to advance favored legal policy positions?145 Indeed, political scientists
have long argued that legal policy goals are paramount in judicial decision
making.146 The dominant political science models see randomly assigned
panels and the need to secure two votes as obstacles to work around in the
pursuit of favored legal policy goals.147
Often overlooked in this literature, however, is the fact that federal
appeals judges also care deeply about their reputations—reputations
regarding not just outcomes but also judicial independence, collegiality,
and other rule-of-law norms. By examining the motivations of federal
appeals judges, we can better appreciate whether and how circuit
personalities matter.
We start with Judge Posner’s observation that judges have multiple
goals including harmonious relations with colleagues as well as
“money[,] income, leisure, power, prestige, reputation, self-respect, the
intrinsic pleasure (challenge, stimulation) of the work, and the other
satisfactions that people seek in a job.”148 This common-sense
observation recognizes that judges are humans and, as such, want to be
liked and respected by those who matter to them. That, of course, is not
to say that appeals judges will not act in ways that are inconsistent with

145
See supra notes 14–16 (noting recent studies that highlight upticks in anti-collegial
partisanship, most notably in dissents and en banc overrulings).
146
See Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, The Strategic Analysis of Judicial Decisions, 6 Ann.
Rev. L & Soc. Sci. 341, 347–49 (2010) (summarizing research analyzing both the Supreme
Court’s and Appellate Courts’ strategic behavior); Michael W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger,
Christopher Zorn & Todd C. Peppers, The Etiology of the Occurrence of En Banc Review in
the U.S. Court of Appeals, 51 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 449, 461 (2007) (drawing links between
ideological considerations and the en banc reviews at the appellate level).
147
Political scientists argue that judges calibrate their decision making to advance their
policy goals as far as possible—so that there are “panel effects” where a liberal judge will take
a strongly liberal position on a panel with like-minded judges but will moderate that position
in order to avoid a dissenting opinion that might set in motion en banc review. See Giles et
al., supra note 146, at 461 (judges in the minority of a circuit will “modify their panel
behavior” to avoid en banc); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa M. Ellman & Andres
Swakicki, Are Judges Political? 8–13 (2006) (discussing how judges will “amplify” or
“dampen” their positions based on ideological preferences of other panel judges). See
generally Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 148–77 (2007)
(examining “panel effects,” where an appellate judge’s vote is swayed by the other two judges
on the panel).
148
Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 36 (2008).
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their core beliefs;149 it is to say that, unlike single-minded, “Spock-like”
automatons that care only about legal policy goals, appellate judges also
care about their reputations with others in their circles.150
In fact, there is good reason to think that appeals judges care a great
deal about their reputations.151 Accepting such a judgeship imposes
numerous costs: a potentially significant pay cut, a draining appointments
and confirmation process, a loss of privacy, and other constraints on
personal activities. Aside from power, judges gain in reputation and the
esteem in which they are held by the individuals and groups that matter
to them. Correspondingly, through their activities both inside the court
(oral argument, opinion writing) and outside the court (speeches,
teaching, interviews) appeals judges—like other humans—take pains to
“project images of themselves that are consistent with the norms in a
particular social setting and with the roles they occupy.”152 Through this
process of “self-presentation,” judges seek to enhance their status among
social and professional networks that matter to them.153
Like other people, judges too are members of multiple groups and
networks, possessing complex social identities. When engaging in self
presentation, federal appeals judges “have a wide array of potential
audiences.”154 Against the backdrop of ideological polarization and the
attendant confirmation wars, attention is now focused on the growing role
of national policy groups. And while the affiliation of appeals judges with

149

Holly Arrow, Joseph E. McGrath & Jennifer L. Berdahl, Small Groups as Complex
Systems 70–77 (2000). For appeals judges with strong ideological leanings, legal policy
preferences are particularly important (but are still counterbalanced by other motivations). See
Baum, supra note 11, at 54–55 (highlighting continuing relevance of a judge’s interest in
interpreting the law well regardless of their policy preferences).
150
See Baum, supra note 11, at 60; Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme
Court Cares About Elites, Not the American People, 98 Geo. L.J. 1515, 1532–33 (2010).
151
See Baum & Devins, supra note 150, at 1532–36; Thomas J. Miceli & Metin M. Coşgel,
Reputation and Judicial Decision-making, 23 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 31, 49 (1994).
152
Mark R. Leary, Self-Presentation: Impression Management and Interpersonal Behavior
67 (1996).
153
Like other humans, judges engage in “impression management” by seeking to control
how they are “perceived by other people.” Id. at 2; see also Barry R. Schlenker & Michael F.
Weigold, Interpersonal Processes Involving Impression Regulation and Management, 43 Ann.
Rev. Psych. 133, 134 (1992) (explaining that people engage in impression management by
regulating information they present to audiences).
154
Baum, supra note 11, at 50.

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1354

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:1315

those groups is certainly consequential,155 we think it important to
recognize that other audiences matter too—including audiences that bring
together ideologically disparate appeals judges. For this reason, we think
that circuit personalities are highly significant; they create common
ground for judges interested in their reputations to build those reputations
with court colleagues and the legal community at large. Two aspects of
such reputation-building are particularly noteworthy.
First, lawyers generally embrace the norm that judicial decision
making is not just raw power brokering but instead is “governed by a
consideration of the relevant legal factors.”156 Judges—like all lawyers—
come to the bench already well inculcated with this norm; indeed, this
notion that the law matters is “woven tightly into the fabric of legal
education and the legal profession” generally.157 Consider, for example,
the fact that not one Trump-appointed judge backed the President’s claim
of a stolen election; instead, these judges castigated the President for
failing to make specific allegations or provide proof.158 This rebuke was
certainly a triumph for the rule of law. But it was also a triumph of the
elite social and professional networks that these judges inhabit. Of the
fifty-four federal appeals judges who were appointed by President Donald
Trump, forty-three had clerked on the federal courts of appeals (twenty of
whom also clerked at the Supreme Court); ten had been full-time law
professors (with sixteen others teaching as adjuncts); and fifteen regularly
argued before federal courts of appeals (ten of whom had also argued
before the Supreme Court).159 In short, these judges had strong incentive

155

See infra notes 269–74 and accompanying text (noting the ties between the Federalist
Society and the Republican-appointed judges in the Fifth Circuit, which has backed various
conservative causes).
156
Wendy L. Martinek, Judges as Members of Small Groups, in The Psychology of Judicial
Decision Making 73, 77 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010).
157
Id. For a 2016 study (that one of us coauthored) demonstrating how legal training and
norms enabled lawyers and judges (but not the general public) to overcome ideological priors,
see Dan Kahan et al., “Ideology” or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of
Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 349, 370 (2016).
158
John O. McGinnis, Constitutional Fidelity, City J.: Eye on the News (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://www.city-journal.org/in-election-lawsuits-trump-judges-follow-the-law [https://perm
a.cc/N3EK-5BUV].
159
See Memo from Jon Suttile to Neal Devins, Circuit Personalities, Jan. 8, 2022 (on file
with author) (data set obtained by compiling biographical information from the Federal
Judicial Center on Trump appointees to the U.S. Courts of Appeals). To find the biographical
information for individual judges, see Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges,
1789–present, Fed. Jud. Ctr., https://www.fjc.gov/node/7946 [https://perma.cc/V6JL-6ZR9].
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to protect the integrity of a judicial system that rewarded both them and
the law-oriented audiences that mattered to them.
Second, in addition to their commitment to law-based decision making,
federal court of appeals judges—even those with competing legal policy
preferences—care about their reputation among their judicial colleagues,
particularly judges on their own court. “[A]necdotal and systematic
evidence make clear that there is an affective component to the
interactions between and among judges” who sit on the same circuit.160
Colleagues, as Larry Baum put it, “function as a true peer group, people
who share the same position and work in the same situation. In appellate
courts, they are especially well situated to assess each other’s work.”161
Not only are appellate court decisions “inherently collective,” appellate
judges are “behaviorally interdependent” because they adhere to circuit
personalities and must follow circuit precedent.162
Our interviews repeatedly reinforced how much appeals judges cared
about their interface with colleagues. This was particularly true of circuits
with fewer judges; these judges frequently sit on panels with each other
as compared to larger courts “where the number of judges makes it more
difficult to develop or sustain personal relationships.”163 It is also true of
courts where nonresidential judges converge to hear cases away from
home; these judges “work, eat and sleep in the same buildings, a situation
that keeps them all in almost constant contact.”164
While largely tied to a judge’s relation to other judges in their circuit,
this commitment to collegiality was also tied to the desire of judges in one
circuit (most notably the chief judge)165 to demonstrate the
160

Martinek, supra note 156, at 75.
Baum, supra note 11, at 54.
162
Martinek, supra note 156, at 75 (quoting Baum, supra note 11, at 51). For a thoroughgoing examination of whether and when federal appeals judges prioritize circuit precedent,
see David E. Klein, Making Law in the United States Courts of Appeals 57–61 (2002).
163
Hettinger et al., supra note 2, at 35; Interview with 1st Cir. Judge (Mar. 12, 2021) (notes
on file with editors); Interview with 8th Cir. Judge (Mar. 12, 2021) (notes on file with editors);
Interview with 11th Cir. Judge (Jan. 27, 2021) (notes on file with editors); see also Patricia M.
Wald, Thoughts on Decisionmaking, 87 W. Va. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1984) (identifying “the respect
of our fellow judges” as a constraint on a judge’s decisions).
164
Daniel Egler, Hallowed Chambers, Chi. Trib., Mar. 12, 1984 (§ 2), at 8 (explaining
analogous experiences of a non-resident state supreme court justice). In our interviews, several
judges highlighted how out-of-town sittings facilitated collegiality. See Interview with 5th
Cir. Judge (Mar. 26, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with 11th Cir. Judge (Apr.
1, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
165
For an understanding of why the chief judge has a different set of incentives than her
colleagues, see Levy & Newman, supra note 2, at 2442.
161
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professionalism of their court to the judges in other circuits.166
Institutional reputation matters too. “Court culture teaches that a court that
presents a unified face has fewer fragmented opinions, has a higher degree
of civility among its judges, speaks with a higher degree of moral
authority, and enjoys a higher degree of legitimacy.”167 As one judge we
interviewed put it, dividing up on partisan grounds too often is, frankly, a
“bad look.”168
Appeals judges also abide by rule-of-law norms in order to earn the
respect of the larger legal community. Law-oriented behavior is a
powerful expectation in the legal community. Larry Baum wrote:
Because of their socialization and experience, lawyers appreciate a
judge’s commitment to legal reasoning and skill in interpreting the law.
For this reason, judges who want the respect of practicing lawyers, legal
academics, and other judges have an incentive to be perceived as
committed to the law and skilled in its interpretation.169

All of this to say that the very nature of a U.S. Court of Appeals judge
(one’s motivations, one’s norms fostered by legal education, one’s desire
to enhance reputation) is enhanced by belonging to a smaller group with
sticky traditions and cultures. The circuit personalities matter, in other
words, because they are central to forming and supporting how an
appellate judge sees herself and the work she does on a daily basis.

166
See Interview with D.C. Cir. Judge (Apr. 19, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview
with 6th Cir. Judge (Apr. 30, 2021) (notes on file with editors); Interview with 7th Cir. Judge
(Mar. 1, 2021) (notes on file with editors). For an explanation of why judges on other courts
are an important reference group, see Baum, supra note 11, at 103–04 (emphasizing that these
judges have similar status and do similar work). It should also be noted that judges on appeals
courts compete with each other for promotions to the U.S. Supreme Court and for invitations
to conferences, advisory boards, etc. See id. at 81–82.
167
Jonathan Matthew Cohen, Inside Appellate Courts: The Impact of Court Organization
on Judicial Decision Making in the United States Courts of Appeals 173 (2002). Learned Hand
(who sat on the Second Circuit from 1924 to 1961) went so far as to suggest that dissent fosters
the view that law is political by canceling “the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the
authority of a bench of judges so largely depends.” Hettinger et al., supra note 2, at 19 (quoting
Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 72 (1958)); see also James Oakes, Personal Reflections on
Learned Hand and the Second Circuit, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 387, 387–89 (1995) (discussing
Learned Hand’s influence on the Second Circuit’s prestige and his “commanding presence
both in and out of the courtroom”).
168
Interview with 11th Cir. Judge (Jan. 27, 2021) (notes on file with editors).
169
Baum, supra note 11, at 106.
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III. THE THREAT TO CIRCUIT PERSONALITIES: CENTRALIZED NATIONAL
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
Standing in sharp contrast to circuit personalities is the nationalization
of American politics and American life.170 Just as circuit personalities are
a kind of superglue that bonds the judges of a circuit together,
nationalization works as a counterweight: it calls on circuit judges to
eschew that which makes their circuit unique and look, instead, to a
different common measure.171 In today’s hyperpolarized world,
nationalization also calls for judges to identify with a political party. In
other words, rather than see themselves as judges on a unique circuit, the
threat is that appeals judges will see themselves as Trump judges or Biden
judges.
In this section, we will explore this threat to circuit personalities,
detailing the rise and reach of divisive partisan nationalization. Our
principal concern, of course, is the rise of centralized national politics in
the appointment and confirmation of appeals judges. But judicial
appointments are a manifestation of a much larger phenomenon. State and
local connections matter far less to Americans now than ever before.
Americans instead look to national politics as a proxy for all politics.172
We increasingly see ourselves as Democrats or Republicans locked in
battle with the other.173 By disassociating from the communities where
we reside, ideology plays an increasingly large role in defining new
nationwide communities as the communities that matter to us.174

170
See David J. Hopkins, The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Political
Behavior Nationalized 2 (2018); Oriana Schwindt, The Unbearable Sameness of Cities, N.Y.
Mag., https://nymag.com/urbanist/article/the-unbearable-sameness-of-cities.html [https://per
ma.cc/NDQ5-W5AQ] (last visited Mar. 19, 2022) (observing the similarities of coffee shops,
bars, restaurants, and architecture in different American cities).
171
This tug and pull between national and local was likewise critical to the constitutional
design. “For the framers, citizens’ state-level loyalties were a critical counterweight to the
centralizing tendencies inherent in a federal system.” Hopkins, supra note 170, at 5.
172
See David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 763, 765 (2017)
(noting that voters tended to choose state legislators based on their national party affiliation).
173
See Cass R. Sunstein, Going to Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide 4–7 (2009).
174
Schleicher, supra note 172, at 767 (citing Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher,
Informing Consent: Voter Ignorance, Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev.
363, 397–98).
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A. The Rise of Nationalization
Before the 1980s Reagan Revolution, ideological diversity was a
hallmark of both Democrats and Republicans; at this time, Southern
Democrats and liberal Rockefeller Republicans were integral members of
their respective parties.175 This allowed each state to see themselves as a
“distinct societ[y]” associated with a unique character and unique
values.176 Dwight Eisenhower put it this way: “There is not one
Republican Party, there are 48 state Republican parties.”177 Accordingly,
for Democrats and Republicans alike, state-level politics could run the
liberal-to-conservative gamut.
Consider, for example, state abortion politics.178 From 1973 to 1989,
forty-eight states had passed 306 abortion measures in response to Roe v.
Wade.179 “Challenger” states took the lead challenging the boundaries of
Roe by, for example, enacting waiting period and informed consent
requirements; “supporter” states backed abortion rights through state
funding and greater abortion access.180 Unlike today’s red-blue national
divide, challenger states and supporter states were neither
overwhelmingly Democratic nor overwhelmingly Republican.181
Challenger states, for example, included Illinois, Massachusetts, and

175

See Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 Calif. L. Rev. 273, 288–89 (2011). By 1994, 23% of Republicans
were more liberal than the median Democrat and 17% of Democrats were more conservative
than the median Republican; in 2017, the median Republican was more conservative than 97%
of Democrats—so essentially a perfect partisan/ideological division. The Partisan Divide on
Political Values Grows Even Wider, Pew Rsch. Ctr. (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.pe
wresearch.org/politics/2017/10/05/1-partisan-divides-over-political-values-widen/ [https://pe
rma.cc/72DA-U4MB].
176
Daniel J. Elazar, Foreword: The Moral Compass of State Constitutionalism, 30 Rutgers
L.J. 849, 861 (1999).
177
Lee Drutman, America Has Local Political Institutions but Nationalized Politics. This Is
a Problem., Vox (May 31, 2018), https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2018/5/31/17406590/local
-national-political-institutions-polarization-federalism [https://perma.cc/A2TU-88KJ].
178
See generally Mary Ziegler, Abortion and the Law in America 1–10 (2020) (outlining
the legal battles surrounding abortion); Neal Devins, Rethinking Judicial Minimalism:
Abortion Politics, Party Polarization and the Consequences of Returning the Constitution to
Elected Government, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 935, 938 (2016) (arguing that the issue of abortion
rights was not as deeply divisive a matter between Democrats and Republicans as it is in the
current politically polarized society).
179
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Neal Devins, Shaping Constitutional Values 60 (1996).
180
See Glen Halva-Neubauer, Abortion Policy in the Post-Webster Age, 20 Publius 27, 32–
33 (1990).
181
See Devins, supra note 178, at 956 (citing Halva-Neubauer, supra note 180, at 32–41).
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Minnesota; supporter states included Alaska, Kansas, and New
Hampshire.182
In today’s polarized world, of course, there is a sharp RepublicanDemocrat divide on a broad spectrum of issues—abortion being one of
them.183 Party leaders and lawmakers at all levels embrace so-called
“message politics,” that is, party efforts to differentiate their party from
the other by using the legislative process to make symbolic statements to
voters and other constituents.184 More than that (and key to our concerns),
the Democratic and Republican parties have taken steps to advance a
distinctive national message and for that message to permeate local, state,
and national politics.185
Today, state legislatures increasingly outsource the drafting of
legislation to national interest groups (which draft model legislation)186 or
look to sister states with similar politics.187 More telling, national politics
drive state legislative elections.188 A study of policy divergence between
182

See Halva-Neubauer, supra note 180, at 32.
Starting in the 1990s, Democrat and Republican voters began to diverge on abortion;
needless to say, red state and blue state politics reflected that divergence. See Devins, supra
note 178, at 964–82.
184
See C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in Congress
Reconsidered 217, 219–20 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001).
185
For this reason, Ed Rubin and Malcolm Feeley argue that “the American people . . . have
a unified political identity . . . [wherein they] identify themselves primarily as Americans.”
Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward Rubin, Federalism: Political Identity & Tragic Compromise
115 (2008). This nationalization of state politics arguably has resulted in states (dominated by
the party not in the White House) serving as the principal check on presidential power. See
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1077, 1105–08 (2014).
186
Most states, for example, look to organizations like the American Legislative Exchange
Council (“ALEC”) to see if there is relevant draft legislation in their data base. See Molly
Jackman, ALEC’s Influence Over Lawmaking in State Legislatures, Brookings (Dec. 6, 2013),
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/alecs-influence-over-lawmaking-in-state-legislatures/
[https://perma.cc/AT45-JCJX]. ALEC is an organization devoted to conservative policies; it
works with conservative state legislators/legislatures. See id.
187
Copycat legislation is particularly common on divisive issues like abortion, immigration,
and religion. See Amber Phillips, 14 States Have Passed Laws This Year Making it Harder to
Get an Abortion, Wash. Post (June 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/06/01/14-states-have-passed-laws-making-it-harder-to-get-an-abortion-alreadythis-year/ [https://perma.cc/BMT3-QFCR]; June Kim, Tara Kearns & Gerald P. López,
Arizona and National Immigration Crisis, https://libguides.law.ucla.edu/c.php?g=183374&p=
1208481 [https://perma.cc/RN3T-ZP94] (last visited Apr. 1, 2022); Jonathan Griffin,
Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, 23 Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures: LegisBrief (May
20, 2015), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/religious-freedom-restor
ation-acts-lb.aspx [https://perma.cc/5XDG-XNTY].
188
David N. Schleicher, Federalism is in a Bad State, Harv. L. Rev. Blog (Oct. 12, 2018),
https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/federalism-is-in-a-bad-state/ [https://perma.cc/4JHU-A87
183
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the home district and national party of a congressional candidate found
that “when candidates . . . balance the broad policy views of the local
district and the national party, the national party dominates.”189
Correspondingly, national issues that divide the parties now dominate
state politics and state elections.
In our home state of Virginia, for example, the 2017 and 2021
gubernatorial races turned on health care, abortion, critical race theory in
the schools, and Donald Trump.190 In 2021, moreover, the gubernatorial
race was widely viewed as a referendum on the Biden presidency.191
B. What Nationalization Means
Nationalization has two significant manifestations. First, local identity,
local customs, and local norms give way as we increasingly look to
national political parties, national media, and the like to shape our
Q]; see also Hopkins, supra note 170, at 2–4 (noting “gubernatorial voting and presidential
voting have become increasingly indistinguishable”); Schleicher, supra note 172, at 763
(referring to voter behavior in state elections as “second order” because it “reflect[s] voter
preferences about the President and Congress”); James A. Gardner, The Myth of State
Autonomy: Federalism, Political Parties, and the National Colonization of State Politics, 29
J.L. & Pol. 1, 3 (2013) (“The electorate . . . has become increasingly oriented toward national
politics at the expense of state and local politics.”).
189
Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, Jr. & Charles Stewart, III, Candidate
Positioning in U.S. House Elections, 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 136, 136 (2001). A comparable study
of candidates for state office similarly found that—in the aggregate—“the states appear to
follow the national pattern of high and growing [party] polarization.” Boris Shor & Nolan
McCarty, The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures, 105 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 530,
549–50 (2011).
190
See John Sides, 4 Important Takeaways from the Virginia Governor’s Race, Wash. Post:
The Monkey Cage (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/
2017/11/08/4-important-takeaways-from-the-virginia-governors-race/ [https://perma.cc/WM
56-2NBM]; Jeff Greenfield, One Lesson of Virginia? The Culture War Still Works, Politico
(Nov. 3, 2021, 12:35 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/11/03/virginiaelection-culture-wars-518701 [https://perma.cc/9QVY-SEJ2].
191
See Dan Balz, A Sobering Reality Hits Democrats After Election Losses, Wash. Post
(Nov. 3, 2021, 3:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/a-sobering-reality-hitsdemocrats-after-tuesdays-elections-losses/2021/11/03/7c6e988e-3ca5-11ec-a493-51b0252de
a0c_story.html?request-id=c86506d6-dc80-4ddc-92ac-e4bf29a1e36d&pml=1 [https://perma.
cc/GQJ7-9A9U]. Indeed, national politicians (Stacy Abrams, Barack Obama, Kamala Harris,
Joe and Jill Biden) actively campaigned for Democratic gubernatorial candidate Terry
McAuliffe. See Jill Colvin, In Virginia, McAuliffe Brings Big Names, Youngkin Goes Solo,
AP (Oct. 29, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/campaigns-michael-pence-virginia-election2020-terry-mcauliffe-e5f5e08ce998ddd9456716e373bf5151 [https://perma.cc/T5MY-STG
2]. For other examples of out-of-state politicians and celebrities, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen,
States of the Union, Harv. L. Rev. Blog (Oct. 17, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/sta
tes-of-the-union/ [https://perma.cc/WYA5-QKQ5].
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communities—meaning the people we spend time with and listen to daily.
Second, to the extent that political parties and other nationwide groups
are divided, individuals too will identify with one or another national
group as opposed to regional ones.192
As is well-known, people now get their news and opinion programming
from outlets that reinforce pre-existing ideological commitments.193 This
means conservatives and liberals alike—no longer exposed to competing
viewpoints—shift to the dominant position in their ideological group.194
Inevitably, this echo chamber transcends politics and spills over to public
attitudes regarding members of their own party and especially the
opposition party. As social science research makes clear, “partisan
identities have become more closely aligned with social, cultural, and
ideological divisions in American society.”195 Democrats and
Republicans alike “say that the other party’s members are hypocritical,
selfish, and closed-minded, and they are unwilling to socialize across
party lines.”196 They inform pollsters that they do not want their children
to marry an opposing partisan;197 they grade the opposing party as thirty
on a hundred point scale;198 a majority would even support a candidate
from their party who “openly violat[es] democratic principles like
electoral fairness, checks and balances, or civil liberties.”199 The upshot:
192

50.

193

See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 189, at 137; Shor & McCarty, supra note 189, at 549–

See generally Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, The Company They Keep: How Partisan
Divisions Came to the Supreme Court 115–18 (2019) (tracing the “increasing polarization in
the media, the academy, and the bar” since the 1980s).
194
Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.com 2.0, at 65 (2007) (“[P]eople want to be perceived
favorably by other group members, and also to perceive themselves favorably.”).
195
Alan I. Abramowitz & Steven Webster, The Rise of Negative Partisanship and the
Nationalization of U.S. Elections in the 21st Century, 41 Electoral Stud. 12, 12 (2016).
196
Shanto Iyengar, Yphtach Lelkes, Matthew Levendusky, Neil Malhotra & Sean J.
Westwood, The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States, 22
Ann. Rev. Pol. Sci. 129, 130 (2019), https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev
-polisci-051117-073034 [https://perma.cc/3BPP-GJGC].
197
Cass R. Sunstein, Partyism Now Trumps Racism, Bloomberg: BloombergView (Sept.
22, 2014, 8:03 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2014-09-22/partyismnow-trumps-racism [https://perma.cc/DU2H-PNGS].
198
Ezra Klein & Alvin Chang, “Political Identity is Fair Game for Hatred”: How
Republicans and Democrats Discriminate, Vox (Dec. 7, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.vox.com
/2015/12/7/9790764/partisan-discrimination [https://perma.cc/6WKV-WNDR].
199
Thomas B. Edsall, How Much Does How Much We Hate Each Other Matter?, N.Y.
Times (Sept. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/29/opinion/political-polarizationpartisanship.html [https://perma.cc/VN6V-ZBL8] (quoting Eli J. Finkel et al., Political
Sectarianism in America, 370 Sci. 533, 534 (2020)).
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“Republicans and Democrats increasingly dislike, even loathe, their
opponents.”200
This shift away from geographic identification and towards ideological
identification is quite evident in the legal world. It is reinforced by the
emergence of ideological social networks that pit conservative legal
thinkers against liberal legal thinkers. Most notably (for our purposes),
membership in local bar groups has given way to membership in either
the conservative Federalist Society or liberal groups such as the American
Constitution Society (both national organizations).201
Law school chapters of the Federalist Society, for example, provide
opportunities for conservative law students to socialize with each other,
to secure judicial clerkships with conservative judges, and to meet (and
potentially forge relationships with) prominent conservative academics
and lawyers.202 For practicing lawyers, local chapters of the Federalist
Society (and the Society’s annual lawyers’ convention in Washington,
D.C.) likewise provide conservative lawyers with opportunities to
network and socialize with each other.203
For liberal law students and lawyers, the American Constitution
Society (ACS) fills a similar purpose: “200 student and lawyer chapters
in 48 states” make up “[t]he engine that drives ACS’s work.”204 This
means that from the beginning of their legal careers, the job opportunities
and friendship circles of budding lawyers are now being shaped by
national organizations with specific ideological bents.

200
Shanto Iyengar, Gaurav Sood & Yphtach Lelkes, Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity
Perspective on Polarization, 76 Pub. Op. Q. 405, 405 (2012).
201
A particularly telling example of the demise of local bar groups and rise of ideologically
based groups is the nomination and eventual withdrawal of Supreme Court candidate Harriet
Miers. Miers (a former head of the Texas state bar) was assailed by conservatives for her lack
of Federalist Society “credentials” and for being too closely tied to bar groups. Amanda HollisBrusky, Ideas with Consequences: The Federalist Society and the Conservative
Counterrevolution 153 (2015).
202
See Hollis-Brusky, supra note 201, at 153–54.
203
Id. at 2. Wesley Hodges, the Fed Soc Debate Turns Inward, Am. Conservative (Nov. 19,
2021), https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/the-fed-soc-debate-turns-inward/
[https://perma.cc/S7QH-6DFH].
204
American Constitution Society Chapters, Am. Const. Soc’y, https://www.acslaw.org/acs
-chapters/ [https://perma.cc/R6KV-UN3P].
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C. Nationalization and the U.S. Courts of Appeals
Needless to say, the courts of appeals are subject to the same great
nationalizing tides and currents which engulf the rest of society.205 In
particular, beginning with Ronald Reagan in 1981, ideology has played
an ever-increasing role in the appointment of federal appeals judges.206
Moreover, senators from states where there is an appeals court vacancy
have less power to influence either the appointments or confirmation
process.207 Finally, nationalization is fueled by basic changes in
technology (computer-driven research), federal appeals practice (the rise
of practice groups in national law firms), and the hiring and placement of
federal appeals clerks (the rise of ideological credentialing).208
We start with the 1981 shift to ideology in judicial appointments. From
1945–1980, there was no partisan ideological divide, and neither party
sought political advantage by linking party to ideology for judicial
appointments.209 Indeed, the percentage of liberal votes cast by
Eisenhower appointees (56%) is nearly identical to Kennedy (59%) and
Johnson appointees (59%);210 likewise, liberal votes cast by Nixon (46%)
and Ford (44%) appointees more closely track Democrat Bill Clinton
(48%) than Republicans Ronald Reagan (39%) and George W. Bush
(38%).211
With the Reagan Revolution, however, courts were seen as a “primary
player in the formulation of public policy,” and ideological considerations
became dominant in judicial selections.212 Republican appeals court
nominees became more conservative, and an increasingly large partisan
gap emerged between Republican and Democratic nominees.213 Consider,
205
This sentence is drawn from Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process
168 (1921).
206
See Devins & Larsen, supra note 8, at 1391–95.
207
See infra text accompanying notes 231–37.
208
See infra text accompanying notes 238–55.
209
See supra text accompanying note 175.
210
See Sunstein et al., supra note 147, at 114–15.
211
Id. Jimmy Carter’s nominees cast liberal votes 54% of the time. See id.
212
David M. O’Brien, Why Many Think that Ronald Reagan’s Court Appointments May
Have Been His Chief Legacy, Hist. Network News, http://www.historynewsnetwork.org
/article/10968 [https://perma.cc/2VUD-Q3EV] (last visited Mar. 10, 2022) (quoting Reagan
Department of Justice official Bruce Fein); see also David Alistair Yalof, Pursuit of Justices:
Presidential Politics and the Selection of Supreme Court Nominees 134 (1999) (explaining
that ideological considerations were “the most important criteria” for Reagan’s judicial
selections).
213
See Sunstein et al., supra note 147, at 122–23.
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for example, the ascendancy of the Federalist Society in nationalizing
Republican judicial picks. Starting with Ronald Reagan, Federalist
Society membership has effectively become the sine qua non of
Republican judicial nominees.214 In particular, membership is seen as a
reliable proxy for conservativism: Federalist Society judges are more
conservative than other judges215 and their shared embrace of originalism
and textualism provides a roadmap of how to decide cases.216 Federalist
Society judges, moreover, were the most likely to disagree with their
Democrat-appointed colleagues.217 And, Federalist Society judges are
loyalists. When the U.S. Judicial Conference questioned the
appropriateness of federal judges being members of the Federalist
Society, forty-six of Trump’s first fifty-one appeals court nominees were
part of a group of 210 federal judges (93% of whom were appointed by
Republican presidents) that accused the Conference of engaging in “rank
discrimination based on its erroneous perception of a Federalist Society
viewpoint.”218
For their part, Democrats have increasingly “borrowed the Federalist
Society’s tactics.”219 In particular, ideology has become “the near
exclusive focus” and “less deference to the wishes of home state senators
[is now afforded] than was traditionally offered.”220 Correspondingly,
214

During the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations (1981–1993), the Federalist
Society (formed in 1982) was too new to play a dominant role in the cultivation and vetting
of judges. See Devins & Baum, supra note 193, at 117, 126. During those years, Society
membership was not critical to judicial appointments; in sharp contrast, 85% of Donald
Trump’s 2017–2020 appeals nominees were Federalist Society members. See Nancy Scherer
& Banks Miller, The Federalist Society’s Influence on the Federal Judiciary, 62 Pol. Rsch. Q.
366, 367 (2009); Ruiz et al., supra note 14.
215
See Scherer & Miller, supra note 214, at 370–71 (finding that membership in Federalist
Society was a statistically significant factor in predicting the likelihood of a judge’s tendency
to decide that “state government’s rights prevail over the federal government’s rights,” which
they used as a proxy for conservatism).
216
See Hollis-Brusky, supra note 201, at 54–56.
217
See Ruiz et al., supra note 14.
218
Letter from D.C. Circuit Judge Katsas et al., to Robert P. Deyling, Assistant Gen. Couns.,
Admin. Off. U.S. Cts. (Mar. 18, 2020), https://s.wsj.net/public/resources/documents/Resp
onsetoAdvisoryOpinion117.pdf [https://perma.cc/PG5X-TRV7] (calculations performed by
authors).
219
Dahlia Lithwick, Biden Borrowed the Federalist Society’s Tactics. Good., Slate (Mar.
30, 2021, 2:25 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/03/biden-judges-nominationsfederalist-society-tactics.html [https://perma.cc/9H5W-BDJ6].
220
Id.; Brandon L. Bartels, The Sources and Consequences of Polarization in the U.S.
Supreme Court, in American Gridlock: The Sources, Character, and Impact of Political
Polarization 171, 177 (James A. Thurber & Antoine Yoshinaka eds., 2015).
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Demand Justice and other national interest groups have also “double[d]
down on pressuring” home-state senators to advance liberal objectives by
promoting public defenders, civil rights attorneys, and others likely to
share progressive beliefs.221 Not surprisingly, Democratic appeals picks
are both more liberal than and more likely to be at odds with their
Republican-appointed counterparts.222
This relatively new sorting of Republican- and Democrat-appointed
judges by ideology and methodology pervades all aspects of judicial
decision making, including the hiring and placement of law clerks. A
2017 study correlating ideology rankings for federal appeals judges with
ideology rankings for former law clerks (based on campaign
contributions) found that the “judges with the more extreme [ideology]
scores—either liberal or conservative—hire clerks that exhibit less
ideological diversity than do judges with more moderate [ideology]
scores.”223 Correspondingly, during the very period when party
polarization exploded (1975–1998), Supreme Court Justices increasingly
221
See Lithwick, supra note 219; Carl Hulse, Progressive Groups Urge Biden to Move
Quickly on Diverse Slate of Judges, N.Y. Times (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2
020/12/11/us/progressive-groups-biden-judges.html [https://perma.cc/U258-JGT8].
222
For more about Trump’s judicial picks and the rise in party-line dissents, see Ruiz et al.,
supra note 14 (finding Trump appointees were more consistent in voting along party lines and
that their involvement on a panel resulted in more dissents); Rebecca R. Ruiz & Robert
Gebeloff, As Trump Leaves the White House, His Imprint on the Judiciary Deepens, N.Y.
Times (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/17/us/politics/trump-judgesappeals-courts.html [https://perma.cc/HB76-G794] (same); Memorandum from Jon Green,
Co-Founder of Data for Progress, The Ideology of Trump’s Judges, https://www.filesforp
rogress.org/memos/Trump%20Judges%20Memo%20-%20Demand%20Justice%20-Final.pd
f [https://perma.cc/39GA-7QPF] (finding Trump appointees more polarized than appointees
of other recent presidents based on campaign finance data). For ideology and Biden nominees,
see Lithwick, supra note 219 (stating that President Biden’s nominations have “satisfied
progressive groups” and that the Biden administration may pay less attention to the relatively
“conservative” preferences of Democratic senators); Jess Bravin, Biden Aims to Appoint
Liberal Judges After Trump’s Conservative Push, Wall St. J. (Nov. 28, 2020, 5:30 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-aims-to-appoint-liberal-judges-after-trumps-conservativ
e-push-11606559402 [https://perma.cc/8ESZ-MJUS] (discussing President Biden’s liberal
“judicial philosophy”); Andrew Kragie, Biden’s Judges Will Likely Be More Liberal Than
Obama’s, Law360 (Nov. 30, 2020, 11:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/13326
34/biden-s-judges-will-likely-be-more-liberal-than-obama-s [https://perma.cc/876W-U8EJ]
(explaining that Biden would likely focus on ideology and to a greater extent than Obama).
223
Adam Bonica, Adam S. Chilton, Jacob Goldin, Kyle Rozema & Maya Sen, Measuring
Judicial Ideology Using Law Clerk Hiring, 19 Am. L & Econ. Rev. 129, 130–31, 138, 144
(2017); see also Adam Bonica, Adam S. Chilton, Jacob Goldin, Kyle Rozema & Maya Sen,
The Political Ideologies of Law Clerks, 19 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 96, 123 (2017) (“[T]he more
conservative a judge, the more conservative his or her clerks tend to be.”).

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1366

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:1315

turned to ideologically simpatico federal appeals judges to find law
clerks.224 Former Fourth Circuit Judge Luttig put it this way: “[I]t should
come as no surprise to learn that the more liberal judges tend . . . to hire
clerks from other judges who would . . . self-describe themselves as
Democrats, and vice versa for the more conservative judges.”225
Another byproduct of this sorting was to shift power away from homestate senators. Up until 1980, Presidents would look to home-state
senators from their party when appointing federal appeals judges; when
there was no home-state senator from the president’s party, high-ranking
state officials from the President’s party would play a similar role.226
During this time, nominations to the courts of appeals were not
recognized as touchstones of ideological controversy; instead, they were
a “component of presidential and senatorial patronage.”227 Indeed,
presidents would reward political loyalists for their support by shifting an
appeals court seat from another state in the circuit.228
Notwithstanding its emphasis on geography and not ideology, this
patronage system was hugely consequential. Judicial outcome studies
have shown “that the relationship between the party of the appointing
President and judicial outcomes is stronger among judges appointed

224
Corey Ditslear & Lawrence Baum, Selection of Law Clerks and Polarization in the U.S.
Supreme Court, 63 J. Pol. 869, 869, 872, 875–76 (2001). A study of the post-clerkship careers
of Supreme Court clerks likewise suggests that, as partisan divisions among the Justices
became common place, law clerks too sorted themselves out into competing ideological
camps. See generally William E. Nelson, Harvey Rishikof, I. Scott Messinger & Michael Jo,
The Liberal Tradition of the Supreme Court Clerkship: Its Rise, Fall, and Reincarnation?, 62
Vand. L. Rev. 1749 (2009) (describing the “politicization” of the hiring of Supreme Court
clerks).
225
Adam Liptak, A Sign of the Court’s Polarization: Choice of Clerks, N.Y. Times (Sept.
6, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/07/us/politics/07clerks.html [https://perma.cc/Q
V5L-WAF4]. This ideological sorting of clerks and judges extends past the clerkship itself
and further reinforces the nationalization of the federal courts of appeals. For example, several
leading law firms recruit clerks from either liberal or conservative chambers. See id. (noting
that liberal Supreme Court clerks go to Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr, and Jenner &
Block whereas conservatives go to Kirkland & Ellis, Sidley Austin, and Jones Day); Nelson
et al., supra note 224, at 1784–86 (same).
226
See generally Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges (1997) (exploring the role of
home senators in selecting federal judges). By implication, senatorial “courtesy” also came to
mean that “senators will give serious consideration to and be favorably disposed to support an
individual senator of the president’s party who opposes a nominee.” Harold W. Chase, Federal
Judges: The Appointing Process 7 (1972).
227
Kevin M. Scott & R. Sam Garrett, Assessing Changes in State Representation on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 41 Pres. Stud. Q. 777, 778 (2011).
228
See id. at 782.
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where senatorial courtesy was not in play (i.e., no senator of the
President’s party from the state) than among judges appointed under the
condition of senatorial courtesy.”229 Likewise, some ideological rankings
of federal appeals judges use the ideological ranking of a home state
senator to rank the federal appeals judges whenever senatorial courtesy is
extended.230
By empowering national interest groups at the expense of home-state
senators, this shift to ideology “placed a strain” on Senate confirmations.
“While opposition senators were willing to defer to [ideologically
diverse] patronage-based nominees, they became increasingly unwilling
to defer to ideologically based nominees.”231 Home-state senators from
the opposition party, for example, “saw that they could use blue slips to
promote their own policy goals as well.”232 Blue slips allowed home-state
senators of either party to block a disfavored nominee to a high federal
office in her state.233 A vestige of the patronage system, blue slips
preserved the “prestige and political power” of home-state senators by
assuring that the president could only “make such appointments as would
be palatable to them.”234
Blue slips, however, could not withstand the crush of party
polarization. Senators had every reason to back the policy goals of their
229

Michael W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A
Note on Policy and Partisan Selection Agendas, 54 Pol. Rsch. Q. 623, 624 (2001) (referencing
1980s and 1990s studies). Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers likewise found that “the linkage
between presidential preferences and judicial outcomes disappears” when “senatorial courtesy
is in play.” Id. at 623.
230
See id. at 623–24; Donald R. Songer & Martha Humphries Ginn, Assessing the Impact
of Presidential and Home State Influences on Judicial Decisionmaking in the United States
Courts of Appeals, 55 Pol. Rsch. Q. 299, 299 (2002) (finding preferences of home-state
senators of the president’s party “significantly related to judges’ votes”).
231
Donald E. Campbell, To “Advice and ConsentDelay”: The Role of Interest Groups in
the Confirmation of Judges to the Federal Courts of Appeal, 8 Nw. J.L. & Soc. Pol’y 1, 8–9
(2012); see also Nancy Scherer, Scoring Points: Politicians, Activists, and the Lower Federal
Court Appointment Process 108–09 (2005) (describing how partisan activists began
influencing senators to oppose the confirmation of disfavored nominees).
232
Scherer, supra note 231, at 142. In addition to blue slips, opposition party senators made
use of holds, filibusters, and (when in the majority) scheduling powers. See Sarah A. Binder
& Forrest Maltzman, Advice and Dissent: The Struggle to Shape the Federal Judiciary 56–57
(2009).
233
See Sarah A. Binder, Where Do Institutions Come From? Exploring the Origins of the
Senate Blue Slip, 21 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 1, 2 (2007); Mitchel A. Sollenberger, The Blue Slip:
A Theory of Unified and Divided Government, 1979–2009, 37 Cong. & Presidency 125, 125,
138 (2010).
234
Chase, supra note 226, at 7.
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party and no reason to empower their political opponents.235 In 2018,
Senate Republicans rejected blue slips submitted by opposition party
senators;236 in 2021, Senate Democrats also repudiated opposition party
blue slips.237 With the demise of blue slips, ideology and national party
identity have now fully eclipsed patronage and home-state power.
***
Although one may be tempted to conclude that this is a story about
party polarization in the appointments of federal judges, the take-home
point is larger than that. This shift to nationalization on the federal courts
of appeals is about more than ideology and partisanship. Nationalization
is also about where we eat, work, and shop; how we access information;
and so much more. We close this section by noting four critical,
interrelated changes in federal courts of appeals decision making—
changes that push toward nationalization but have nothing to do with
ideology. While it is unclear how much each of these changes impacted
appeals court decision making, we feel confident that as a group they have
contributed to the nationalizing of the federal courts of appeals.238
235

For this very reason, Senate Democrats eliminated the filibuster of lower federal court
nominees in 2013. See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most
Filibusters on Nominees, Wash. Post (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/polit
ics/senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precede
nt/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q2G5EBBN].
236
Seung Min Kim, Grassley Rips up ‘Blue Slip’ for a Pair of Trump Court Picks, Politico
(Nov. 16, 2017, 6:16 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/16/chuck-grassley-trumpcourt-picks-245367 [https://perma.cc/AA5U-H8QU].
237
See Marianne Levine, Senate Dems Take a Page from GOP in Judicial Nominee Battles,
Politico (Feb. 17, 2021, 5:38 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/17/courtnominees-democrats-469500 [https://perma.cc/H9P6-8B52]. At the same time, President
Biden initially sought to fast-track nominees from states where there were no Republican
senators. Russell Wheeler, Biden is Appointing Judges Faster than Trump, and Most Everyone
Else—for Now, Brookings (Sept. 2, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021
/09/02/biden-is-appointing-judges-faster-than-trump-and-most-everyone-else-for-now/ [https
://perma.cc/DJC3-KXE2]. By November 2021, however, Biden had advanced a nominee to a
Sixth Circuit seat in Tennessee without the support of either of Tennessee’s two Republican
senators. See Madison Adler, Tennessee Senators Unhappy with Consultation on Judge Pick,
Bloomberg L.: US L. Week (Nov. 18, 2021, 6:48 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/uslaw-week/tennessee-senators-decry-lack-of-consultation-on-judge-nominee [https://perma.cc
/X432-PUKS].
238
Nor do we think this list is exhaustive. When hiring law clerks, for example, federal
appeals judges seek to hire top students from top national law schools. In our interviews, we
heard from several judges that they compete with other judges for the same students and rarely
give priority to students from their home-state law school. This process, as noted supra, often
reinforces ideological nationalization—for conservative and liberal judges may seek out
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First, legal research: lawyers and law clerks now look at keywords in
large databases when doing legal research (think Google-style word
search instead of old-school Shepardizing). Electronic researchers
“access a far greater number of cases” with the result that “fewer people
read full cases.”239 One likely result of this shift is that there is less
emphasis on analogical reasoning related to expanding or distinguishing
the law of the circuit and more emphasis on existing cases (perhaps from
other circuits) whose keywords match the facts of the case.240
Second, judicial reliance on law clerks: judges increasingly turn to law
clerks to write opinions.241 Today, federal appeals judges can hire as
many as four law clerks (as compared to two in 1980);242 not surprisingly,
judges’ reliance on law clerks has grown as the ratio of clerks to judges
increases.243 Schooled in keyword searches and fresh out of law school,244
law clerks typically look for precedential support in opinions from higher
courts (rather than seek to distinguish or challenge judicial rulings).245
“Indeed, studies have found that the rise of law clerks has resulted in a
dramatic upswing in the number of cited cases in judicial opinions.”246
Third, the dramatic growth of the appeals court docket: the rise of the
importance of law clerks is very much linked to the explosive growth in
cases now resolved by the federal courts of appeals.247 From 1980 to

students who belong to national groups like the Federalist Society or American Constitution
Society. Cf. supra notes 223–25 and accompanying text (explaining that some judges hire
clerks with similar ideologies).
239
Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 59, 74–76 (2013).
240
Neal Devins & David Klein, The Vanishing Common Law Judge?, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev.
595, 621–22 (2017); see also Peter M. Tiersma, The Textualization of Precedent, 82 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 1187, 1189–90 (2007) (discussing the “shift from legal reasoning to close
reading” and the “textualization of precedent”).
241
See Jonathan S. Masur & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Deference Mistakes, 82 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 643, 665 (2015).
242
See Todd C. Peppers, Michael W. Giles & Bridget Tainer-Parkins, Surgeons or Scribes?
The Role of United States Court of Appeals Law Clerks in “Appellate Triage”, 98 Marq. L.
Rev. 313, 315–16 (2014).
243
See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform 141 (1996).
244
See Albert Yoon, Law Clerks and the Institutional Design of the Federal Judiciary, 98
Marq. L. Rev. 131, 140–41 (2014) (claiming that clerks tend to be in their late twenties).
245
See Devins & Klein, supra note 240, at 622–23.
246
See id. at 622 (discussing by analogy Frank B. Cross, James F. Spriggs II, Timothy R.
Johnson & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of
Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 489, 539–40).
247
See Nadine J. Wichern, A Court of Clerks, Not of Men: Serving Justice in the Media
Age, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 621, 649 (1999) (“Over the years, the clerk-author has been accepted
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2020, the number of cases appealed each year to the federal courts of
appeals more than doubled (from 23,200 to 48,205).248 During about the
same period, the number of judgeships increased 25% (from 132 in 1978
to 167 in 2021).249 Remarkably, over the past three decades, there were
no additional judgeships created.250 The inevitable result of this mismatch
of judicial resources to judicial needs is that judges have less time to
participate in the development of law and are more apt to rely on
precedent—so that judges tackling similar issues will rely on the same
body of precedent.251 This phenomenon is reinforced by the rise of law
clerks (who are particularly interested in citing higher court precedent)
and computer-driven research (where keyword searches yield the same
cluster of cases).
Fourth, the rise of the national appellate bar: starting in 1985 (when
Reagan’s Solicitor General Rex Lee established a Supreme Court and
appellate practice at Sidley Austin), national law firms have established
federal appellate practice groups.252 Typically headed by lawyers from
the Solicitor General’s office, these appellate shops have transformed
as somewhat of a necessary band-aid for an overworked judiciary. Echoing throughout the
chambers of our courts are the cries and moans of docket strain.”).
248
For 1980, see Fed. Jud. Ctr., Caseloads: U.S. Courts of Appeals, 1892–2017, https://ww
w.fjc.gov/history/courts/caseloads-us-courts-appeals-1892-2017 [https://perma.cc/MH4LL7ZZ] (last visited Mar. 15, 2022). For 2020, we relied on the Federal Judicial Center’s
Integrated Database, see Fed. Jud. Ctr., Appellate Cases Fiscal Year 2020, https://ww
w.fjc.gov/research/idb/appellate-cases-filed-terminated-and-pending-fy-2008-present [https:/
/perma.cc/P2JU-HZND] (last visited Mar. 15, 2022) (SAS dataset). See also Devins & Klein,
supra note 240, at 623–24 (describing increases in the number of cases filed in federal district
courts).
249
See U.S. Cts., U.S. Courts of Appeals Additional Authorized Judgeships,
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/appealsauth.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG2R-S5YX]
(last visited Jan. 12, 2022). This calculation excludes the Federal Circuit, created in 1982. See
id.
250
See id. (noting that 1990 was the last year that Congress enacted legislation creating
additional federal judgeships).
251
Another inevitable result of this distribution of judicial resources is that appeals courts
make use of unpublished opinions and other “procedural shortcuts” that permit them to
prioritize which cases receive judicial attention. For an examination of the costs of such
shortcuts and a related call to increase the numbers of appeals court judges, see Merritt
McAlister, Rebuilding the Federal Circuit Courts, 116 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1137, 1137, 1150
(2022).
252
Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 Va. L. Rev. 1901, 1916
(2016); see also Deepak Gupta, Leveling the Playing Field on Appeal: The Case for a Plaintiff
Side Appellate Bar, 54 Duq. L. Rev. 383, 386 (2016) (discussing the rise of dedicated appellate
practices since 1985); Thomas G. Hungar & Nikesh Jindal, Observations on the Rise of the
Appellate Litigator, 29 Rev. of Litig. 511, 512–17, 520 (2010) (same).
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Supreme Court and federal appeals court advocacy.253 In particular,
appellate specialists are now handling cases that were once managed by
trial lawyers or in-house counsel.254 These specialists, moreover, are now
repeat players before the federal courts of appeals (so much so that some
federal appeals judges told us about the increasing frequency of hearing
from a well-regarded appeals lawyer).255 In other words, law practice in
the regional circuits is often dominated by national lawyers with similar
pedigrees (often based in Washington, D.C.).
The upshot of all of this is that today’s nationalization is an outgrowth
of changes in politics, culture, markets, and technology. It is not at all
surprising that the American judicial system would reflect these broader
societal changes. This does not necessarily mean that all roads lead to
Rome and, as such, the federal courts of appeals will simply mirror
nationalization in politics and other spheres. As we will now explain,
circuit personalities serve as an important counterweight to
nationalization. But the challenge is formidable.
CONCLUSION: WHY CIRCUIT PERSONALITIES ARE OUR BEST PATH
FORWARD
Finally, we turn now to connect the dots and explain how investing in
circuit personalities is the best path towards mitigating nationalizing
partisan forces in the judiciary. To do so, we accept certain realities,
explore what is at stake, and lay out some best practices we learned from
our interviews.
First, a reality check. The nationalizing and polarizing forces described
above are not likely to change any time soon. We recognize that judges
are part of a national process and are connected to national groups.
Relatedly, we recognize that judges have normative and methodological
commitments and that those priors also mean that there will sometimes
253

See Hungar & Jindal, supra note 252, at 521–25 (noting that appellate practice groups
were created so that law firms could compete in a national market for clients who increasingly
wanted a federal appellate specialist).
254
See id. at 524; see also Larsen & Devins, supra note 252, at 1931 (noting that some large
corporations switched law firms in order to ensure high-quality appellate representation).
255
See Interview with 3d Cir. Judge (Feb. 8, 2021) (notes on file with editors). Moreover,
since there are so many of these shops and so few merits cases before the Supreme Court, the
bread and butter of these practice groups is federal appeals court litigation. See Larsen &
Devins, supra note 252, at 1929–30 (quoting former Solicitors General Greg Garre and Neal
Katyal regarding the marquee value of having a Supreme Court practice while the lion’s share
of cases are federal appeals cases).

COPYRIGHT © 2022 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

1372

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 108:1315

be an inevitable partisan divide on the bench. This is particularly true with
respect to the most visible and divisive issues.
At the same time and while accepting that reality, it is imperative to
recognize that judges are members of multiple networks, including their
circuits. Circuit personalities are a mechanism by which judges build
attachment to those smaller networks—networks which are distinctively
local and bipartisan. Needless to say, judges who care a great deal about
their reputation among other judges will be more mindful of their
colleagues than judges with thin attachment to their circuits and stronger
attachment to national ideological audiences.256
Furthermore, and often overlooked, commitment to a circuit
personality is also a mechanism by which judges can advance the vision
of an appeals judge laid out at the start of Part II.257 As we explained, there
is an integrity to the court of appeals model of judging. It involves largely
anonymous actors in randomly assigned panels of three committed to the
idea of decision by deliberation and the assumption that any panel of them
can get a case right.258 This model of judging is premised on two
principles: (1) that any judge can work with any other judge, and (2) that
there is law to apply separate and apart from the ideological priors every
judge necessarily brings to the bench. Under this view, federal appeals
judges are more akin to interchangeable widgets than to attention-seeking
ideological warriors.
Keeping this model of judging in the forefront brings to light what is
truly at stake in this battle between nationalizing partisan forces and
circuit personalities. Nobody denies that there will be some highly
divisive cases in the courts of appeals (dealing with a President’s tax
records, or abortion, or affirmative action, for example) that will almost
inevitably result in dividing the judges by the party of the President who
appointed them. That reality cannot be changed.

256
Through a process known as identity salience, judges must prioritize—determining
which social identity matters most. See Philip S. Brenner, Richard T. Serpe & Sheldon Stryker,
The Causal Ordering of Prominence and Salience in Identity Theory: An Empirical
Explanation, 3 Soc. Psych. Q. 231, 232 (2014).
257
See supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text.
258
Ferroli, supra note 67, at 16 (quoting Judge Sutton as saying all circuit judges “agree to
follow the same judicial oath, making them all equally susceptible to error.” Mitts v. Bagley,
626 F.3d 366, 370 (6th Cir. 2010) (Sutton, J., concurring)).
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But in the 95% of cases that do not neatly divide by politics or ideology,
the judges have seen—and must see—past their partisan stripes.259 It is
the decision making in those cases (the ones that do not make headlines)
that is truly at risk today. So even if there is no escaping the partisan divide
in nationally salient cases, it is nonetheless imperative that those breadand-butter cases feature “a collective process in which judges reason their
way together to the right answer.”260 There is a social glue in the nature
of circuit personalities—a glue that allows Democrat and Republican
appointed judges to reason together and look for common ground. That
glue will dissolve if the judges see each other as “partisan warriors”
committed to national causes.261
To appreciate the stakes, consider the following dystopia. If judges
value their national networks over their local ones, every case becomes a
battleground. This means more focus on the cases that divide by party
lines (and a desire to find such cases, as they would become the lifeblood
of ideologically driven judges). That also brings the inevitable uptick in
en bancs and more dissents and concurrences. As a consequence, this
increase means a slower pace to decision which will result in more
screening and far fewer cases being heard. That slowdown, in turn, means
that a litigant’s purported right to appeal would be watered down—there
would be fewer oral arguments, fewer published opinions, more focus on
the cases that divide by party lines. Before long the lower appellate courts
would start to look a lot like the U.S. Supreme Court: with a virtually
discretionary docket, less anonymity, more attention-seeking, headlinegrabbing dissents, and certainly fewer cases decided on a common
ground. Put simply (albeit dramatically), the “my team / your team”
national dynamic would destroy the courts of appeals as we know them.

259

Ninety-five percent comes from then-Senator Barack Obama who—when voting against
the confirmation of Chief Justice John Roberts—drew a distinction between the “95 percent
of cases” decided by law and the “5 percent of cases that are truly difficult.” Editorial, Why
Obama Voted Against Roberts, Wall St. J. (June 2, 2009, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.c
om/articles/SB124390047073474499 [https://perma.cc/33Q8-LSY7]; see also Edwards, supra
note 4, at 61 (“The majority of cases in the circuit courts admit of a right or a best answer,”
regardless of ideological differences); Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning
the “Politics” of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. Colo. L. Rev.
619, 622–25 (1985) (arguing that although “there are certain sorts of cases in which a judge’s
moral and political views unavoidably come into play,” most circuit court decision making is
non-partisan).
260
Harris, supra note 9, at 77.
261
In re Trump, 958 F.3d 274, 292 (4th Cir. 2020) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).
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And this worry is not hypothetical. Two examples stand out as
highlighting the challenges judges face in the battle between national
commitments and commitments to their circuits: the liberalism of the
Ninth Circuit in the early 2000s262 and the conservatism of today’s Fifth
Circuit.263
From 2000 to 2015, the Ninth Circuit reached liberal outcomes more
than any other circuit; this liberalism was at odds with increasing Supreme
Court conservativism, and the Ninth Circuit reversal rate was at 83.6%,
“the outer bounds” of all circuits.264 Progressive icon Judge Reinhardt
said at the time: “I follow the law the way it used to be, before the
Supreme Court began rolling back a lot of people’s rights.”265 Judge
Reinhardt’s views were shared by many of his Ninth Circuit colleagues
during this time period. These judges were not just part of the same circuit
but also part of the same social and professional communities whose
members “applaud[ed] judges for liberal stands on civil liberties
issues.”266 This support might have been “sufficient to outweigh any
damage to judges’ reputations from other quarters,” because the Ninth
Circuit’s liberalism persisted through at least 2018.267 When Donald
Trump took office in 2017, national civil rights and liberties organizations
262

In 2000, eighteen of the twenty-five active judges on the Ninth Circuit were Democratappointees (eleven of whom were nominated by Bill Clinton during the increasingly polarized
1990s). See Kevin M. Scott, Supreme Court Reversals of the Ninth Circuit, 48 Ariz. L. Rev.
341, 350–51 (2006); The Need for New Lower Court Judgeships, 30 Years in the Making:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cts., Intell. Prop., & the Internet of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 117th Cong. 1 (2021) (statement of Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Milton R. Underwood
Chair in Free Enterprise and Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School). For a discussion of
some conflicting evidence on this subject, see Linda Qui, Does the Ninth Circuit Have the
Highest Reversal Rate in the Country?, N.Y. Times (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/11/26/us/politics/fact-check-trump-ninth-circuit.html [https://perma.cc/MEH7-Z
H5J]. From 2017–2020 (with nine Trump appointees), the Ninth Circuit became less liberal.
See Susan Luthi, How Trump is filling the liberal Ninth Circuit with conservatives, Politico
(Dec. 22, 2019, 7:04 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/22/trump-judges-9thcircuit-appeals-court-088833 [https://perma.cc/646A-82D8].
263
See infra notes 269–77 and accompanying text.
264
Timothy B. Dyk, Thoughts on the Relationship between the Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit, 16 Chi. Kent J. Intell. Prop. 67, 71–72 (2016) (calculating reversal rates
among circuits); see also Qui, supra note 262 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s reversal rate);
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Disorder in the Courts, L.A. Times (July 11, 2007, 12:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-jul-11-oe-fitzpatrick11-story.html [https://pe
rma.cc/6YMK-V9BG].
265
William Carlsen, Frontier Justice, S.F. Chron., Oct. 6, 1996, at 1–5.
266
Baum, supra note 11, at 112.
267
Id.; see also infra note 268 (identifying challenges to Trump’s policies in the Ninth
Circuit).
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regularly turned to the Ninth Circuit to block the Trump administration’s
initiatives on immigration, the border wall, the Keystone Pipeline, and
much more.268
Today’s conservative Fifth Circuit tells a similar tale. With a lopsided
divide of twelve Republican-appointed judges (all of whom have
Federalist Society ties) and five Democrat-appointed judges,269 the Fifth
Circuit has been the go-to circuit for conservative challenges to
progressive policies.270 Not only has the Fifth Circuit backed conservative
causes (sometimes disregarding Supreme Court precedent271), it has also
sought to push out the boundaries of its jurisdiction, and, in so doing, it
has made a mark for itself.272 In November 2021, for example, it issued
an opinion nullifying Biden administration COVID regulations.273 More
striking than its legal analysis, the appeals court rushed the decision out—
knowing that its decision would shortly be nullified as a well-established

268
See Adam Liptak, Trump Takes Aim at Appeals Court, Calling it a Disgrace, N.Y. Times
(Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/us/politics/trump-appeals-courtninth-circuit.html [https://perma.cc/QA82-UKYA] (discussing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476 (9th Cir. 2018) (immigration), East Bay Sanctuary
Covenant v. Trump, 349 F. Supp. 3d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (same), Indigenous Env’t Network
v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 5661 (D. Mont. 2018) (Keystone Pipeline), and Hawaii
v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (travel ban)); Sierra Club v. Trump, 929 F.3d 670 (2019) (border
wall). For a discussion of whether the Ninth Circuit remains out of step with an increasingly
conservative Supreme Court, see David Savage, With Trump Appointees Supreme Court
Delivers 9th Circuit Another Year of Reversals, L.A. Times (July 13, 2021),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2021-07-13/with-trump-appointees-9th-circuit-suffer
s-another-year-of-reversals-at-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/7QBS-FB4W].
269
All Fifth Circuit Republican-appointed judges have spoken at Federalist Society events;
several are active members who regularly speak at both local and national events. See Memo
from Jon Suttile to Neal Devins, supra note 159 (using the Federalist Society’s website to
identify speaking events with Fifth Circuit judges).
270
See Brent Kendall, Conservative Appeals Court is Prime Venue for Biden-Era Litigation,
Wall St. J. (Oct. 22, 2021, 6:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/conservative-appealscourt-is-prime-venue-for-biden-era-litigation-11634907602 [https://perma.cc/QY2D-S47P].
271
That, at least, is how Chief Justice Roberts saw the Fifth Circuit’s 2018 approval of a
Louisiana abortion restriction that was nearly identical to a Texas restriction that the Supreme
Court had declared unconstitutional in 2016. June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103,
2133–34 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
272
See Linda Greenhouse, What Happens When a Court Goes Rogue?, N.Y. Times (Nov.
18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/18/opinion/abortion-covid19-supreme-court.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/SP5U-DHRD].
273
See id. (discussing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA, 17
F.4th 604 (5th Cir. 2021)).
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procedure was already underway to transfer control of the case to another
circuit.274
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit’s recent dynamics have made headlines with
blistering dissents, accusations of lawlessness, and even a resignation.
Judge Jerry Smith, a Reagan appointee, accused two of his Republicanappointed colleagues of committing an “orgy of jurisprudential violence”
when they held (over Judge Smith’s dissent and in an unpublished
opinion) that judges can block a private company’s vaccine mandate on
the grounds of religious discrimination.275 And Judge Costas, a 2014
Obama appointee, resigned his post on the Fifth Circuit, explaining that
he thinks that the “increased polarization that is afflicting society” is
extending to the courts.276 In the words of Judge Jerry Smith, “the good
ship Fifth Circuit is afire . . . . We need all hands on deck.”277
It is not lost on us that there are structural similarities in these two
circuits. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits are the two largest circuits in the
country, and there was/is a lack of ideological diversity on these courts.278
274
See Andrea Hsu, 6th Circuit Court “Wins” Lottery to Hear Lawsuits Against Biden’s
Vaccine Rule, NPR (Nov. 16, 2021, 4:07 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/11/16/1056121842/
biden-lawsuit-osha-vaccine-mandate-court-lottery [https://perma.cc/M5ET-423T]. One more
example: on January 17, 2022, the Fifth Circuit divided two (Republican appointees) to one
(Democrat appointee) on whether to return the Texas fetal heartbeat case to the district court
that had earlier ruled against the state or, instead, to ask the Texas Supreme Court to provide
guidance on the statute (and effectively keep the statute in place—at least until the state court
acted). See Alicia Miranda Ollstein & Josh Gerstein, Appeals Court Detours Texas Abortion
Ban Case to State Supreme Court, Politico (Jan. 17, 2022, 7:30 PM), https://www.politi
co.com/news/2022/01/17/appeals-court-texas-abortion-527256 [https://perma.cc/EN5U-GT
HM].
275
Sambrano v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 21-11159, 2022 WL 486610, at *28 (5th Cir. Feb.
17, 2022).
276
See Debra Cassens Weiss, 5th Circuit Judge Resigns to Focus on Trial Work as an
Attorney, ABA J. (Feb. 11, 2022, 8:47 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/5thcircuit-judge-resigns-to-focus-on-trial-work-as-an-attorney [https://perma.cc/63WP-XD5H].
277
Daniel Conrad, Fifth Circuit Opinion in United Airlines Vaccine Mandate Case Conjures
Fiery Dissent, Courthouse News Serv. (Feb. 17, 2022), https://www.courthousenews.com/fift
h-circuit-opinion-in-united-airlines-vaccine-mandate-case-conjures-fiery-dissent/ [https://per
ma.cc/T3K2-AG5K] (citing Sambrano, 2022 WL 486610, at *38 n.95 (Smith, J., dissenting).
278
Commentators and judges alike have proposed splitting the Ninth Circuit, in part because
of concerns related to nonrepresentative panels. See generally Diarmuid F. O’Scanlain, A
Decade of Reversal: The Ninth Circuit’s Record in the Supreme Court Through October Term
2010, 87 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2165 (2012) (offering the perspective of one Ninth Circuit
judge); see also The Case for Restructuring the Ninth Circuit: An Inevitable Response to an
Unavoidable Problem: Hearing on Oversight of the Structure of the Federal Courts Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight, Agency Action, Fed. Rts. & Fed. Cts. of the Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary (2018) (Statement of Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scanlain), https://www.judiciary.senate
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But it is also hard to deny that these examples illustrate the possibility of
branding one’s circuit as a poster child for a cause. In so doing, the ability
of judges to work collegially across party lines is threatened. Indeed,
consistent with our dystopian scenario, Republican-appointed judges on
the Ninth Circuit are increasingly calling for en banc review and writing
fiery dissents when it is denied.279
Nationalization is a grave threat to the ability of federal courts of
appeals to perform their most basic functions. And while circuit
personalities will not negate the growing ideological divide between
judges appointed by Democrats and by Republicans, circuit personalities
provide a shared path for all judges to travel. By reinforcing local bonds,
judges can see themselves, not as partisan adversaries, but as colleagues
committed to the rule of law.
***
Quite clearly, we are at an inflection point. As noted at the start of this
Article, there is abundant evidence of a turn to divisive partisanship on
the federal courts of appeals.280 And, as Part III shows, “my team / your
team” nationalizing is now part and parcel of American life. To avoid
federal appeals judges succumbing to these nationalizing forces by
fighting for their “team” at every turn, it clearly is time to invest in circuit
personalities. Circuit personalities may not be a panacea but certainly
provide an important counterweight to divisive polarization.
So what does such an investment look like? We do not offer a blueprint
of the perfect circuit personality. As our recounting of the experiences of
the Sixth and D.C. Circuits makes clear,281 appeals judges must chart their
own paths in finding ways to come together to buttress their commitment
to collegiality and, with it, bipartisan decision making and the rule of law.
Nonetheless, we did learn a lot from our interviews, and certain best

.gov/imo/media/doc/07-31-18%20O'Scannlain%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/AY3WSN76] (same).
279
See Andrew Wallender & Madison Alder, Ninth Circuit Conservatives Use Muscle to
Signal Supreme Court, Bloomberg L. (Dec. 8, 2021, 4:45 AM), https://news.bloo
mberglaw.com/us-law-week/ninth-circuit-conservatives-use-muscle-to-signal-supreme-court
[https://perma.cc/5P7S-VH9F]. The problem of ideological nationalization would be
exacerbated if, in fact, appeals judges used dissents to en banc denials to signal the Supreme
Court. Specifically, the appeals judges would effectively become ideologically driven agents
to like-minded Justices, reinforcing national ties at the expense of circuit collegiality.
280
See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
281
See supra notes 114–31.
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practices did stand out to us as critical to reinforcing collegiality and the
commitment to the current model of appellate decision making.
First, socializing and face-to-face contact with one another matters
(and matters a lot). Especially important are lunches and dinners that
bring together Democrat and Republican appointees and give them
opportunities to interact as humans and not as adversaries. This face time
is perhaps easier in circuits where the judges travel to hear argument (and
thus naturally dine out together), but with a little creativity, it is also
possible in circuits that do not. Whether it is regular lunches, judicial
retreats, or even annual trips to baseball games, the judges we spoke to
universally reported more collegiality and thus better decisions when they
embraced their similarities and meet socially with one another.
Equally, if not more important, is the other side of the coin: circuit
judges should avoid that which divides them into competing partisan
camps. Although partisan dissents and en bancs may be impossible to
avoid completely, appeals judges should do what they can to limit them,
particularly the ones that fall on partisan lines. This move may sound
Pollyanna-like, but it is entirely possible to build traditions and rules
devoted to limiting partisan conflict. Avoiding en bancs through full-court
circulation or “paper en bancs” and the growing norm of greater
discussion pre-argument in an attempt to seek consensus from the start
are both examples of routes circuits can take to limit the temptation to fall
into warring camps.282 Likewise, we learned that “flashy” language
should be avoided, panels should be shuffled so everyone sits with
everyone else as much as possible, and circuit judges should defer to the
authoring judge on a panel on style and opinion structure. Further, getting
decisions done on time and not tripping each other up waiting on dissents
seems to help buttress collegiality and rule of law norms.
Like family traditions, these features of circuit personalities cannot be
handed down from a national center if they are to be effective. They must
be organically grown from within the circuit, a reflection of commitment
to one another and to the local traditions that bond them together.
The good news is that the pull of circuit personalities—and the desire
to strengthen circuit bonds—seems quite strong. Federal appellate judges
care a great deal about their status and reputation among judges on their
own courts.283 Every judge we interviewed cared very much about
282
283

See supra notes 50–72.
See supra notes 160–64.
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collegiality, about their reputation with colleagues, and about the mutual
commitment to the rule of law. Perhaps this is one reason why in our prior
study we found six decades of en banc decisions (up until 2018) that
resisted partisan impulses.284 Indeed, earlier studies of appeals court
decision making emphasize a similar commitment to collegial decision,
including the disfavoring of dissent and a related commitment to the law
of the circuit.285
The path to preserving the current model of federal appellate judging
is thus right in front of our noses and has been there all along: judges must
invest in and reinforce the local ties that bind them together as a circuit.
And while today’s judges will inevitably also be drawn to the national
networks that they are also a part of, they must never forget that there’s
no place like home.286

284

Devins & Larsen, supra note 8, at 1380.
See Hettinger et al., supra note 2, at 40; Klein, supra note 162, at 32.
286
Thanks to Dorothy for this critical insight.
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